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Abstract
Over the last decade, the field of ministerial durability – exploring why some cabinet
ministers are replaced and others not – has taken an empirical turn. Among others,
Berlinski, Dewan and Dowding (2012) scrutinize the relationship between cabinet ministers
and Prime Ministers in Britain, while Bucur (2013) analyze how ministers in semi-presidential
systems are held accountable by presidents, parties, and prime ministers. However,
ministers in multi-party parliamentary democracies have received little attention. In this
thesis, I explore what determines ministerial durability in post-war Norway. By using
an unmatched data set combination of Norwegian ministers and the resignation calls
they received during their tenure, this thesis provides three main contributions. Firstly,
I find that Norwegian ministers are held accountable by party leaders based on their
performance, merits, and ambitions – not personal characteristics. Secondly, I uncover
that newspapers have an alarming influence on the ministerial deselection process. Finally,
I find that resignation calls – a measure for ministerial performance – bares with it both
endogeneity and validity problems that should be taken into consideration by further
studies on ministerial durability.
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1 | Introduction
On March 5 2012, Audun Lysbakken of the Sosialistisk Venstreparti (Socialist Left Party)
resigned from his post as head of the Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion.
He stated the following:
Let me be very clear: I have full responsibility for the errors that have been made, and I
take full responsibility. I have therefore informed the Prime Minister that I have made the
decision to resign as cabinet minister. (NRK 2012)
The issue Lysbakken resigned over was granting money to a women’s defense club. The
problem was in part that the competition over the grant had been almost non-existent,
but also that Lysbakken himself had close ties to parts of the leadership, which led to
questions on impartiality (Bordvik 2012).
Similarly, in 2007, the foreign minister Jonas Gahr Støre, a prominent figure in
Arbeiderpartiet (Labor Party), took part in pressuring the Minister of Climate and
Environment into a controversial decision by giving permission for oil-reloading in
Bøkfjorden to the company Tschudi & Eitzen Shipping. One of the leading persons of
Tschudi & Eitzen Shipping, Felix Tschudi, was revealed to have had continuous personal
connections to Støre (Magnus 2012). Questions over impartiality were raised yet again,
but, interestingly, this time the minister was not given the axe.
How can the differing outcomes of the Lysbakken and Støre case be explained when
the circumstances are so similar? Does Støre benefit from being a part of the biggest
party in a coalition, and Lysbakken punished because he is part of a smaller party? Is the
political experience of Støre the reason for his survival as cabinet minister? Or was the
media and opposition more hostile towards Lysbakken? More generally, this thesis will
be focused on a broader question: what determines ministerial durability in Norwegian
governments?1 It is common to think of ministerial dismissals as equivalent to political
1I will use the terms cabinet and government interchangeably, even though some argue there is a
technical difference between the terms.
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scandals – such as the Lysbakken case – but ministers might also go quietly. For example,
the Minister of Finance in the immediate post-war period, Erik Brofoss, was offered the
job as Central Bank Governor after more than eight years in cabinet. Few eyebrows were
raised after his long service, and Brofoss himself claimed that he went "from the spotlight
to the scene loft" (Lie 2009).
My task is to explore which factors make ministers more prone to dismissal, making
this an empirical contribution to the ministerial deselection literature. By using a unique
data set combining manually collected ministerial attributes and resignation calls, I focus
on four types of characteristics that is thought to affect ministerial tenure: performance
measured in resignation calls; political experience; cabinet specific characteristics such as
parliamentary basis (majority/minority) and party composition (single-party/coalition);
and personal characteristics such as age, gender, and education.
Parliamentary democracies are built on the idea of delegation and accountability;
in the Norwegian political system, the electorate delegates power to the legislature, the
legislature to the party leaders, the party leaders to ministers, and ministers to civil
servants, whereas accountability runs in the opposite direction. The chain of delegation
and accountability constitutes the main framework of the principal-agent theory, which
is utilized in this thesis. More specifically, I investigate whether ministers are held
accountable by their principal – the party leader. This is achieved by using resignation
calls – a count of how many times political and non-political actors have urged the minister
to resign publicly during her/his tenure – as a performance measure; ministers getting
resignation calls are assumed to be performing badly.
The analyses show that resignation calls (pooled on all actors) have a strong effect
on ministerial durability: the more resignation calls a minister gets, the more likely
the minister is to be removed. Consequently, I argue that ministers are generally
held accountable by their party leaders whenever they are perceived to perform badly.
Furthermore, the results of an actor based resignation call model suggest that neither
the opposition nor the minister’s own party have any influence on tenure when they
judge ministerial performance. Newspapers, however, are found to have influence on the
deselection process, which means that newspapers have a more important monitoring
function than the parties and the opposition do. Accordingly, I argue that this could pose
some democratic problems; an unelected entity influences the accountability mechanism
2
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between party leaders and ministers more than elected officials do.
With regard to political experience, ministers who have previously occupied
parliamentary seats are found to sit safer than ministers without such experience, while
ministers with previous cabinet experience are more likely to be replaced than fresh
ministers. The divergent findings with regard to political experience are, on the one
hand, believed to be that previous cabinet experience makes ministers exposed to a
wear-and-tear effect; party leaders replace ministers to keep the cabinet vigorous. On
the other hand, parliament experience increases the durability of ministers because they
have been left less exposed to the public, but still obtained enough political experience
necessary to handle the pressure of being in cabinet position.
Interestingly, cabinet characteristics are not found to affect ministerial tenure. The
analyses suggest that ministers in coalition cabinets are as likely to be dismissed as
ministers in single-party cabinets, and ministers in majority cabinets neither more nor less
likely to be dismissed than their minority colleagues. This indicates that party system
and cabinet composition have little relevance as variables when it comes to dismissing
ministers in Norway; party leaders act similarly between different kinds of cabinets.
Furthermore, I argue that this finding could be a stepping-stone for comparative studies
of other parliamentary democracies where more valid inferences can be made on whether
institutional factors are relevant for ministerial durability.
Personal characteristics are also found to have a limited effect on ministerial tenure,
with one exception; I use age as a measure of ambition, where younger ministers are
assumed more ambitious than their older colleagues. The finding clearly indicates that
older ministers are more prone to dismissal than their younger colleagues.
Finally, in a separate analysis, I also find that there is some noise in the resignation call
measure; female ministers get more resignation calls than their male colleagues; ministers
with higher education get more resignation calls than ministers with lower education; and
ministers with long tenures get more resignation calls than ministers with more short-lived
cabinet careers, raising concerns about endogeneity from the initial analysis. However, a
robustness check, where resignation calls are replaced by resignation calls per year, shows
that endogeneity is less problematic than firstly anticipated. Nevertheless, the remaining
noise in the resignation call measure leads me to argue that some efforts should be made
in further studies to improve the validity of resignation calls as a performance measure,
3
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or even develop new indicators for performance.
1.1 The case of Norway
The motivation behind choosing Norway, apart from further closing the research gap in
the ministerial deselection literature, is manifold. With a strong opposition, important
role of parties, and high transparency, Norwegian ministers are in theory expected to be
held accountable for irresponsible action.
Firstly, the recurrence of minority and coalition cabinets (and even minority
coalitions) is expected to give parliament a strong position vis-à-vis the cabinet and
its ministers (Strøm 1990: 207). The argument is that ministerial turnover should
increase when the opposition is strong under periods with minority cabinets, or when
policy tensions occur between parties within coalitions cabinets. This is grounded in
the government survival literature, which has generally established that "single-party
governments last longer than coalitions, and that majority governments last longer than
minority governments" (Gallagher, Laver and Mair 2011: 446). In other words, when
parliament is strong in relation to the government, they are more easily held accountable
– a point that can be expanded to cabinet ministers: minority government ministers are
given less room for error by their party leaders because cabinet survival depends on not
losing support in parliament. The same goes for coalition governments: whenever multiple
parties are involved in government, ministerial policy drift can be checked by coalition
partners to prevent putting unfixable strains on the cooperation. In both scenarios, the
solution of replacing a minister is expected to cost less than abandoning the party’s place
in cabinet. Furthermore, the Norwegian legislature arguably has even more power over
cabinets because it has the right to displace the cabinet and individual ministers (Rasch
2004: 88), whereas cabinets have no power to dissolve parliament (Rasch 2004: 128).
Consequently, ministers in minority cabinets sit on the mercy of non-cabinet parties in
parliament, while ministers in coalition cabinets sit on the mercy of their coalition partners
in parliament. In sum, it is expected that ministers under minority and coalition cabinets
are more likely to be dismissed than ministers under majority and single-party cabinets.
Secondly, political parties are omnipresent in Norwegian politics (Heidar 2014:
162); they select candidates for parliamentary elections, collectively decide the policy
preferences in yearly party conferences, control their elected members of parliament, and
4
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more (Narud and Strøm 2011: 242). In addition to acting as a gatekeeper for potential
ministers (Müller 2000: 323), the strong position of political parties is expected to give less
elbowroom for sitting ministers and increase the ministerial turnover for the ministers that
give themselves liberties in policy development. Indeed, ministers often face conflicting
interests between the party policy platform, and their own preferences (Müller 2000: 320).
Breaking the party line is expensive, and could in some cases end in dismissal.
Thirdly, Norway is perceived to be one of the most effective and transparent
countries in the world (see for example Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009)). More
transparency could give less room for ministers to get involved in dodgy affairs, give
stronger reactions against drifting ministers, and better conditions for revealing these
drifts. Furthermore, transparency could also lead to more polarization between political
actors (Stasavage 2007: 59), which again could give the opposition more incentives to
check misbehaving ministers and propose stronger reactions against them. The argument
is not that Norwegian ministers drift more or less than ministers in other countries,
but rather that these drifts are more easily revealed. When connecting transparency to
ministerial performance, which has been closely associated with low ministerial durability
in other studies (Berlinski et al. 2012; Bucur 2013), it can be expected that bad
performance is more likely to be uncovered and sanctioned in Norway.
In sum, these three factors set the stage for holding ministers accountable in Norway;
a strong opposition, influential parties, and high transparency should give little room for
ministerial policy drift and strong reactions against the ministers that do drift.
1.2 The road ahead
The thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, I start by introducing the principal-agent
theory, describing how the chain of delegation and accountability works in parliamentary
democracies and why I regard party leaders as minister’s principal in the Norwegian
case. Furthermore, I discuss possible types of agency loss that can occur between these
party leaders and their ministers. In the second part of Chapter 2, I review some of the
most central findings in previous literature on ministerial durability and media studies
on Norwegian ministers. This discussion is divided into five categories: performance,
political experience, cabinet specific attributes, personal characteristics, and reshuﬄes.
In Chapter 3, I present the main historical lines of cabinet development in post-war
5
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Norway, before I discuss how the cabinet functions as a collective. I proceed by outlining
who the cabinet leaders are and what power they have. Furthermore, I briefly list some
of the roles cabinet members have as heads of departments. Finally, I discuss how parties
help containing agency loss through selection, contract design, and screening.
Because the main analysis is based on event history analyses, I start Chapter 4 by
shortly describing the basics of these statistical models with special focus on the pros
and cons of the semi-parametric Cox Proportional Hazards (Cox PH) model. Secondly,
as I collect most of the data manually, I also give a brief summary over how this was
done. The data set used in this thesis consists of two separate bases: one for individual
minister characteristics and one for resignation calls, where the latter was completely
manually collected, and the first is a combination of other data sets and manually collected
variables. In the final part of Chapter 4, I operationalize the variables used in the event
history analyses and provide some basic descriptive statistics.
I proceed by analyzing two event history models in Chapter 5. Firstly, a pooled
resignation call model – all resignation calls are bundled up in one measure – shows
that underperforming minister are more at risk for losing their cabinet post than
well-performing ministers. Secondly, I divide resignation calls into categories from which
type of actor they came from: the opposition, the minister’s own party, or newspapers.
Surprisingly, only newspapers are found to have any effect on ministerial durability with
the actor-based approach. Neither the minister’s own party nor the opposition are found
to have any influence over the deselection process.
To assess whether the pooled and actor-based resignation call models fit the data, I
show that they predict fairly well and have few influential outliers in the start of Chapter
6. Also, I estimate a count model with resignation calls as the dependent variable to
explore whether there is some noise in the measure. I find that there is both a certain
amount of noise and some traces of endogeneity between resignation calls and ministerial
tenure. Lastly, I show some alternative specifications of the models from Chapter 5. Most
importantly, I introduce resignation calls per year as an explanatory variable to show that
the endogeneity problem was not as problematic as anticipated.
Finally, in Chapter 7, I discuss the findings of the analyses more substantially and
consider some of the limitations with my approach. At the end, I argue that the findings
hardly can be generalized beyond post-war period of Norway, and discuss some possible
6
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ways forward for studies in the field of ministerial durability, before I gather up the threads
in Chapter 8.
7
1.2. The road ahead
8
2 | Building blocks
Even though the Norwegian political system is a constitutional monarchy, it has effectively
been parliamentary throughout the period covered here, where the cabinet has worked
independently from the King and under close monitoring from parliament. In the first
part of this chapter, I introduce the principal-agent theory of parliamentary democracies,
which states that these political systems build on a chain of delegation and accountability.
Firstly, I go through the principal-agent framework in general terms, sketch out the ideal
type based on it, and discuss some of the types of agency loss that can occur between
principals and their agents. Secondly, I proceed with discussing who fires ministers in
Norway specifically, and how agency loss occurs between ministers and their principal
(the party leader).
The second part of this chapter includes discussions on previous literature in the
field of ministerial durability, and hypothesis derived from this literature. Four main sets
of factors are used: performance, political experience, cabinet specific attributes, and
personal characteristics.
2.1 Principal-agent theory
All modern democracies, also parliamentary systems, rely on someone making decisions
on behalf of others. A direct democracy in its ideal type, where each citizen has a direct
vote in all matters, would arguably prove highly inefficient in modern states: everyone
cannot be fully informed on all issues; an agreement will seldom be reached on preferred
policies; and few people will ever be fully satisfied with any aspects of society. Hence,
power is delegated to elected officials in modern democracies (Strøm 2003: 56-57).
In this thesis, I will consider parliamentary governments by a minimal definition,
stating that this is:
[...] a system of government in which the prime minister and his or her cabinet are
9
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accountable to any majority of the members of parliament and can be voted out of office
by the latter, through an ordinary or constructive vote of no confidence. (Müller, Bergman
and Strøm 2003: 13)
The basic idea is that the cabinet must be tolerated by parliament at any time,
actively with an investiture, or through a confidence motion, but also passively as long
as the cabinet does not lose a vote of no confidence. In Norway the cabinet can set
forward confidence motions and parliament can vote the cabinet out of office, but there
is no investiture (Narud and Strøm 2011: 223). This means that Norway fulfill the
requirement of the minimal definition of parliamentary government.
Behind the definition of parliamentary governments lies the principal-agent theory.
In short, the principal-agent theory is based on delegation and accountability: a task is
delegated by a principal to an agent, and the agent then executes the task on behalf of
the principal (Müller et al. 2003: 20). In the context of this thesis, the principal is the
prime minister in single-party cabinets or the ministers’ party leader in coalitions (this
will be discussed below), while the agent is the minister. With delegation there also
comes accountability; when a minister has executed a task, for example outlined a policy
proposal, the principal will evaluate whether the proposal is what she1 was looking for
(Müller et al. 2003: 20). If the principal finds the policy proposal unsatisfying, there
has occurred an agency problem or agency loss, which means that there is a divergence
between the policy outcome preferred by the principal, and the outcome delivered by
the agent (Lupia 2003: 35). The ultimate consequence of agency loss in this context is
ministerial dismissal.
In section 2.1.2, I show that the principal-agent framework can differ between
countries, and that Norway is a case where the ideal-type agency model does not
fit entirely. Firstly, however, I will go deeper into the ideal-type of delegation and
accountability, proceed by discussing some types of agency loss that can occur in these
systems, and connect the agency model to the aims of my analysis and the Norwegian
context.
1In line with the standard in the literature, I will use the gender pronoun she for principals and he
for agents.
10
Chapter 2. Building blocks
2.1.1 A single chain of command
Delegation models all simplify and distort reality. Yet that may be a price worth paying if
such simplifications help us shed light on modern democratic constitutions. (Strøm 2003:
61)
Political science is full of models and ideal type classifications, mainly because the
world is complex and we cannot explain every detail of it; one has to simplify to make
general assessments (Landman 2008: 6-7), and simplifications should be thought of as
representations rather than statements about reality (Clarke and Primo 2007: 742).
As Strøm points out, this is also the case with the principal-agent framework and its
ideal-type.
As mentioned, delegation happens when a principal relieves herself of a task by giving
it to an agent. For example, voters delegate the task of running the country to members of
parliament through elections; the voters are principals, while each member of parliament
(MP) constitutes the agents. On the other hand, parliament is accountable to the voters
at the next election, where they can have their say on parliamentary performance (Müller
et al. 2003: 19-20). Delegation and accountability is the core of the principal-agent
approach with regard to research on parliamentary democracy. But the story does not
end with the voter-parliament relation. In what is described as a chain of delegation, the
task of policymaking is delegated further to the prime minister (PM), who then delegates
specific tasks to his selected ministers, who finally delegates to their department’s civil
servants (Narud and Valen 2007: 209). Predictably, the chain of accountability runs in the
opposite direction. Based on Strøm (2003: 65), figure 2.1.1 gives a graphical illustration
Figure 2.1.1: Chain of delegation and accountability.
Voters
Parliament Prime minister Minister
Civil servants
D
elegation
A
ccountability
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of this ideal-type of delegation and accountability. Most importantly, I will explore the
accountability mechanics between ministers and their principal.
The discussion in section 2.1.2 will show that this picture seldom represent the actual
situations in parliamentary democracies. For example, formal checks by parliaments and
the introduction of political parties complicate the chain. First, however, I will discuss
some of the problems that may arise when tasks are delegated.
Agency loss
In early June 1988, Minister of Government Administration, Anne-Lise Bakken, went out
publicly with criticism of the Head of Personell, Nils R. Mugaas, after it was revealed that
the new head of the Postal Bank had received a huge salary. Bakken was immediately met
with disavowal of responsibility claims; she was the head of the department, and had the
responsibility for its policy areas. In addition, she was believed to have taken a central
part in the appointment (Helgesen and Reesen 1988). The situation worsened when she
refused to apologize in a hearing at the Storting. Bakken was met with resignation calls
from the opposition, newspapers, and even her own party (Versto 1988; Versto and Solberg
1988; Øverby and Solberg 1988). A couple of days later, Bakken was dismissed by the
PM, Gro Harlem Brundland (Helgesen and Reesen 1988).
As is evident in the case of Bakken, whenever differences between what the minister
delivers and what the principal wants there has occurred agency loss (Müller et al. 2003:
23), which ultimately can lead to dismissal. In situations where the agent is perfect, he
would perform the delegated task in the exact same manner as the principal would have
if the task was not delegated (Lupia 2003: 35), but this is, of course, uncommon. Hence,
agency loss is a big part of everyday politics in parliamentary democracy.
Figure 2.1.2 sketches the different types of agency loss that can occur in principal-agent
relationships. Firstly, there might be a difference in preference between the principal and
the agent (Müller et al. 2003: 23); the principal and the agent might look differently on
how to develop certain policies in the best way possible. Secondly, information problems
arise when the principal does "not know enough about their potential agents to get the
best possible deal from them" (Müller et al. 2003: 23). The information problem comes
in two forms: adverse selection and moral hazard. On the one hand, adverse selection, or
hidden information, refers to situations where the principal does not have full information
12
Chapter 2. Building blocks
Figure 2.1.2: Types of agency loss.
Agency loss
Preference differences Information problem
Adverse selection Moral hazard
Based on description from Müller et al. (2003: 23).
on the competence or predilections of the agent, and/or exact information on the relevant
task (Strøm 2000: 270). This means that the principal is always in danger of not selecting
the best agent for the task. On the other hand, moral hazard, also referred to as hidden
action, means that "the principals cannot fully observe the actions of their agents" (Strøm
2000: 270). Here, the agent might get incentives to perform unobservable action that
crosses the principal’s interests. The Bakken case is a good example of this.
If the agency loss is too big there will arise problems in the principal-agent relationship.
Hence, the principal must find ways to contain agency loss. This can be done both
before (ex ante) and after (ex post) the agent is hired. The literature usually give four
methods of containing agency loss: contract design, screening and selection, monitoring
and reporting, and institutional checks, where the two former are ex ante and the latter
two ex post strategies (Strøm 2000: 271). In the case of this thesis, the ex post methods
of containing agency loss is the most relevant, as I will not explore why some ministers
are hired, and others not, but rather why some ministers are fired and others not.
Firstly, monitoring and reporting can be used to force the agent into reporting what
he is doing. One example of this is parliamentary hearings, where the minister has to
report to parliament what parliament wishes to know about the business of the minister’s
department. In the link between ministers and their principal, both personal meetings
with the principal and cabinet meetings as a whole can be other examples of monitoring
and reporting. Indeed, Norwegian PMs have formal rights to request information from her
ministers (Strøm 1994: 42). Secondly, institutional checks "subject particularly critical
agent decisions to the veto powers of other agents or a third party" (Strøm 2000: 271).
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Institutional checks are most common in checks-and-balances systems, but votes of no
confidence against ministers or the government as a whole are examples of institutional
checks in parliamentary systems (Strøm 2003: 63). For Norway in particular, the PM and
the King has an institutional check through their veto power on cabinet propositions for
parliament.
2.1.2 Who fires ministers in Norway?
To appropriately tie the agency model to the Norwegian context, we need to know who
the cabinet principal is, and there is no straightforward answer. Indeed, the Norwegian
constitution does not give hiring or firing powers to any political actors, but rather to
the King (Narud 2000: 170-172). However, in accordance to customary constitutional
practice, the hiring process in single-party cabinets is realized through the PM working
out a list of wanted cabinet members in consultancy with her party’s leading members
(Andenæs 1998: 144). But, in post-war Norway, 37% of the cabinets have been coalition
cabinets, which gives a more complex cabinet composition process: here, the coalition
partners are given more power over appointments from their own party, and hence, the
PM has less power over the selection process (Andenæs 1998: 145). As for firing, which
is the topic of this thesis, former MP, Guttorm Hansen (Labor Party), illustrated the
inability of the PM in firing ministers from other parties within coalitions by stating the
following:
The PM can [in coalitions] presumably only by himself replace the ministers of his own
party. The others are irremovable if their own party does not agree [to dismiss them]. The
outcome is uncertain in a clash between the PM and, for example, the biggest party in the
coalition over one of the ministers of the biggest party. (Hansen 1966)
Hansen clearly gives the PM dismissal powers over the ministers of his own party.
However, he is also at a loss when it comes to who has the firing powers over the ministers
of coalition partners. One possibility is that party leaders, which for the most part occupy
posts in both single-party and coalition cabinets, has the final say over the ministers from
their own party. Indeed, the parliamentary leader of the Socialist Left Party in 2007, Inge
Ryan, argued that "it is up to Kristin [Halvorsen], as the party leader, to decide which
ministers should represent SV. She is the one who must consider whether someone needs to
be replaced" (Johnsen, Hegvik, Johansen, Haugan, Ertesvaag, Torvik and Ertzaas 2007).
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Thus, I see the party leaders of the cabinet as principals; the party leader is "the
one who has the prime responsibility for monitoring the other party officials" (Müller
2000: 325). However, some assumptions are necessary: firstly, party organizations
themselves might have influence over ministerial deselection, and when the party pressure
is sufficiently high, the principal might even dismiss ministers she wants to keep in their
post. However, the assumption is that the party leader must concur and take the final
decision. Secondly, the Storting can also dismiss ministers through a vote of no confidence.
Nevertheless, as the Bakken-case (see section 2.1.1) and other confrontations between
ministers and parliament shows, ministers that are expected to be dismissed by parliament
are either sacked before it happens, or a vote of confidence over the cabinet is used as
a counter-proposal to save the minister. The assumption is thus that party leaders will
dismiss the minister before the Parliament can do it. Lastly, I assume that the PM is
always the de facto party leader of her party. Indeed, as Strøm (1994: 50) maintains "[t]he
prime minister is normally the effective leader of his or her party [in Norway], though the
exact party office held can vary".
2.1.3 Agency loss between ministers and party leaders
The monitoring function of party organizations is important in Norway for reducing
transaction costs and collective action problems on the governmental level; ministers are
less likely to create moral hazard problems if they know that their own party will be on
their neck when they diverge from the ideal party policies (Müller 2000: 313). Brehm and
Gates (1997) sketch three moral hazard problems that can arise between parties and their
agents: leisure-shirking, dissent-shirking, and political sabotage. Firstly, with regard to
ministers, leisure-shirking refer to situations in which the ministers can not be bothered
with doing what it takes to implement wanted party policies. For example, ministers will
have to work harder on getting the party policy through when there are strong preferences
within their department. Hence, it might be attractive for ministers to "subscribe to the
conventional wisdom of their departments rather than work day and night to push through
party goals" (Müller 2000: 321).
Secondly, situations of dissent-shirking arise when ministers do not do their best to
implement party preferences because they have different preferences themselves. In most
cases, this would lead to a policy status quo, as they do not work actively against the
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party, but not actively for it either (Müller 2000: 321). Examples of dissent-shirking are
hard to come by, because there seldom is a change in policy when it happens.
Finally, sabotage occurs when a minister does not agree with the party line, and
chooses to act against it (Brehm and Gates 1997: 30). For example, when the Minister
of Health, Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen (Labor Party), in 2010 withdrew the government’s
promise of building a hospital in Molde, some members of the Labor Party threatened
with resigning from the party – and some actually did resign – because they could not be
members of a party that acted against its own program (Viseth and Therkelsen 2010).
How does this relate to the minister’s principals? I would argue that the same
categories will apply here. Given that party leaders are the cabinet principals that dismiss
ministers, they are the ones who has to act on behalf of the party in cases where ministers
shirk or sabotage enough to be sanctioned or dismissed.
2.2 Ministerial durability
In section 1.1, I shortly outlined some of the expectation on ministerial durability in the
Norwegian case. Here, I will handle some of the most relevant findings in the ministerial
durability literature more thoroughly, and based on its findings deduct hypotheses for
this thesis. The literature can be divided up in three parts: one empirical case-based
part, situated in the field of comparative politics (for example Berlinski et al. (2012),
Bucur (2013), Bucur (2015), Fischer, Kaiser and Rohlfing (2006)), one descriptive part on
Norwegian ministers and cabinets (for example Strøm (1994), Eriksen (1997), Narud and
Strøm (2011)), and media studies on ministerial resignations and scandals in Norway (for
example Allern and Pollack (2009), Enli (2011), Brurås (2003)). In the following sections,
I will look to these contributions in determining what to expect from the Norwegian case
structured sectionally by ministerial performance, political experience, cabinet specific
attributes, and personal characteristics.
2.2.1 Performance
In section 2.1, I presented how delegation always comes hand in hand with accountability
in parliamentary democracies; politicians are "checked and controlled, and if necessary
removed, if their behavior or performance in office is unsatisfactory" (Müller et al. 2003:
4). It is, however, not straightforward to know how well politicians perform, and even
16
Chapter 2. Building blocks
less how to measure ministerial performance. Furthermore, few attempts have been made
at defining a proper systematized concept for ministerial performance. Hence, I use the
following definition as a basis:
Ministerial performance is the level of (dis)satisfaction over how ministers execute
their cabinet duties.
In this thesis, I use resignation calls from political and non-political actors as a
measure of ministerial performance, which is the main measure for exploring whether
party leaders hold their ministers accountable for bad performance. This means that
ministerial performance is bad whenever a political or non-political actor actively wants
the minister removed, but good whenever all actors passively wants the minister to retain
his post. Arguably, resignation calls capture the definition I use fairly well, but it should
be noted that ministers not getting resignation calls are not automatically performing
well (see Chapter 7), something my approach does not capture. The article by Fischer
et al. (2006) on ministerial resignations in Germany was one of the first papers to utilize
resignation calls empirically. They used resignation debates occurring in the first two
pages of the Frankfurter Allgemine Zeitung as a measure of performance (Fischer et al.
2006: 713), and found that the Federal Chancellor and the minister’s own party were the
decisive actors in determining whether a minister should face dismissal or not (Fischer
et al. 2006: 730).
In an approach closer to this thesis, Berlinski, Dewan and Dowding (2010: 559)
introduce resignation calls as a performance measure. These are calls for resignation
during the minister’s tenure, as reported by the media. More specifically, when "someone
in Parliament, media, or some nonpolitical organization suggest the minister should resign,
then it is defined as a ’resignation call’" (Berlinski et al. 2010: 559). Their findings are
clear; with regard to individual responsibility, the more resignation calls a minister gets,
the more likely he is to be dismissed (Berlinski et al. 2012: 165-166). On the other hand,
cumulative calls for resignation in the cabinet as a whole also increase the hazard for the
individual ministers. This means that there is a strong sense of collective responsibility
as well: some ministers will have to fall as a consequence of bad government performance
(Berlinski et al. 2012: 166).
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Finally, Bucur (2013) uses resignation calls, in a similar manner as Berlinski et al.
(2012), as a performance measure on three semi-presidential systems: France, Portugal,
and Romania. She finds that resignation calls is a strong predictor of "ministerial
deselection under unified executive and cohabitation, but not under divided executive"
(Bucur 2013: 247). In other words, on the one hand, performance matters when the
President and the PM are representatives of the same party (unified executive) or when
the president does not represents the government party (cohabitation) (Bucur 2013: 7).
On the other hand, performance is less important when the president represents one of
the governing parties, but the PM represents a different party (divided executive) (Bucur
2013: 7). Based on these three studies, the following hypothesis regarding performance
(measured in resignation calls) is:
H1a: The more resignation calls a minister gets, the less durable will she/he be.2
The approaches described above are mainly based on pooled resignation calls. That
is, all resignation calls are equally weighted and bundled up in one measure. This might
be misleading because resignation calls can come from different political and non-political
actors. Hence, I will also test whether resignation calls uttered by the opposition, the
ministers’ own party, and newspapers increase the dismissal rate equally. Firstly, one
would expect that the frequent occurrence of minority governments is a factor increasing
parliamentary power; minority governments need support from non-governmental parties
to implement policies, and might thus influence the policy outcomes. Indeed, Strøm
(1990: 207) argues that "[m]inority governments strengthen the role of the Storting".
Apart from the period where the Labor Party had a majority of the seats in parliament,
no single-party majorities have held office in post-war Norway. Thus, the opposition is
expected to hold the cabinet and its ministers accountable:
H1b: Ministers that are called to resign by the opposition are less durable than
ministers not called to resign by the opposition.
Secondly, parties are important in Norway (Strøm 1994: 50). Both because ministers
that engage in shirking or sabotage decrease the parties’ ability to move policies from
status quo to the ideal position (Müller 2000: 320) and because ministers are easier to
2All hypotheses are also accompanied by a null-hypothesis of no effect.
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remove than MPs (Müller 2000: 326), it is expected that resignation calls from members
of the ministers own party will have consequences for the minister in question:
H1c: Resignation calls from a minister’s own party decrease the durability of that
minister.
Finally, media studies on political scandals in Norwegian politics can provide a
general outline on what to expect on the role of the media. These studies have mainly
focused on one or two scandals resulting in dismissal, or the role of the media in these
cases more generally. Enli (2011), for example, has delved into the scandal leading to
Manuela Ramin-Osmundsen’s (Labor Party) dismissal after hiring a friend as Children’s
Commissioner. The main argument is that the scandal was a product of both a fierce
media hunt, and a consequence of Ramin-Osmundsen being not only the first ethnic
minority minister in Norwegian history but also a woman. Another example came in the
aftermath of the Tønne case, where the former Minister of Health, Tore Tønne, committed
suicide after a chain of missteps were uncovered by the media (Brurås 2003: 6-8). Both
Hippe (2003) and Brurås (2003) points at the media handling of the case, and concludes
that the media applied a one-eyed approach in covering the case, which eventually saw the
case spinning out of control (Brurås 2003: 82). Several more studies cover different cases
in the same manner (see for example Midtfjeld (2005); Seland (2000); Stordalen (2001)).
More general approaches have also covered how media cover scandals in Norwegian
politics. Allern and Pollack (2009), for example, base their study on seven political
scandal hypotheses, and find some evidence for all of them in the Norwegian context.
Most interestingly, small moral wrongdoings often lead to a boom in media attention;
scandals are mostly focused on individuals, but might also entrain institutions as the case
progresses; the leading newspapers set the agenda and follow the scandal simultaneously;
in Norway, the newspaper Verdens Gang (VG) is seen as the main initiator of political
scandals; different media actors weigh different scandals distinctively according to their
political history and ideological profile; the tolerance of moral standards are lower for
women than for men; and the story often evolves into good versus evil, where the
scandalous politicians are demonized (Allern and Pollack 2009: 197-203).
Hence, Norwegian media studies clearly agree that media plays a big role in political
scandals. My aim is not to uncover the causes of political scandals, but rather how they
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can effect ministerial deselection. I will do this by utilizing newspaper based resignation
calls as an explanatory variable in the analysis, with the following expectation:
H1d: Resignation calls from newspapers decrease ministerial durability.
Testing resignation calls
To test whether resignation calls really measure performance, I will also do a secondary
analysis in section 6.2 with resignation calls as the dependent variable. Neither of the
studies discussed above have investigated whether some ministers are more prone to
getting resignation calls than others – but because resignation calls are used as a proxy
for ministerial performance, it is important to uncover whether they also inherit other
ministerial characteristics than ministerial performance. Hence, both as a consequence of
scarce literature on what resignation calls really measure, and because they are assumed
to be a performance measure, the hypothesis for this analysis is:
H1e: No observable ministerial attributes have an effect on resignation calls.
This means that any attributes having certain effects on resignation calls will serve
blows to it as a performance measure. That is not to say that they are not measuring
performance, but rather that there is noise within the measure that could lead to biased
inferences when using them as independent variables. This will, of course, be discussed
more thoroughly in section 6.2.
2.2.2 Experience
Previous political experience has been utilized through various sets of explanatory
variables in several studies on ministerial durability. Here, I will consider three types
of political experience: previous cabinet experience, parliamentary experience, and
experience from the youth organization of the ministers’ party.
Studies that account for previous cabinet experience have generally found that the
more experience a minister has, the more prone she/he is to dismissal. On the one hand,
cabinet experience in Britain is found to increase the likelihood of dismissal, something
Berlinski et al. (2012: 85) explains as a consequence of low general experience in British
cabinets: "being a minister is a stage in a career, rather than a career itself" (Berlinski
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et al. 2012: 85). On the other hand, Bucur (2013; 2015) argues, based on similar findings
in semi-presidential systems, that "inexperienced ministers are less likely to enter into
conflict with their principals than cabinet members who have held such highly pressured
jobs for a longer period of time" (Bucur 2013: 221). A third explanation from the
government electoral performance literature, that could also apply to individual ministers,
is the "wear-and-tear" effect of being in government (Narud and Valen 2001: 9). Every
explanation, though different, points in the same direction:
H2a: The longer experience ministers have from previous cabinets, the less durable
the minister is in the current cabinet.
A number of studies have also found that ministers sit safer when they have previous
parliamentary experience: Bucur (2013: 125) finds that ministers with parliamentary
experience are less prone to be dismissed, than those with no legislative experience
in France; Bäck, Persson, Vernby and Wockelberg (2009) finds the same for Swedish
ministers, though these results are based on descriptive statistics; and Fischer and Kaiser
(2010: 209) finds that ministers with parliamentary experience sit considerably longer
than those with regional experience. Fischer, Dowding and Dumont (2012: 515) argues
that this is a consequence of ministers having worked their way through the party, and thus
proven themselves worthy before entering office. Nevertheless, as Norwegian cabinets are
particularly low on previous parliamentary experience (Saalfeld 2000: 135), the hypothesis
is the following:
H2b: Ministers with previous parliamentary experience are more durable than
ministers without such experience.
The last type of political experience considered here is party experience. Bucur (2013:
213) uses party executive status and whether the minister is a local party leader as party
experience measures. She finds that neither has any explanatory power on ministerial
durability. Furthermore, data on these attributes were unavailable for the purpose of
this thesis. However, recent findings suggest that experience from the party’s youth
organization increase the chance of parliamentary politicians to assume cabinet posts
(Eilertsen 2014: 53). If we accept this experience as a measure of climbing the ladder of
the party, one could further expect that ministers with youth experience know the party
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line especially well, and are thus less likely to shirk or sabotage the policy wishes of their
party. Hence, the hypothesis with regard to youth party experience reads as follows:
H2c: Ministers with experience from the youth organization (national or local) of
their party are more durable than ministers without such experience
2.2.3 Cabinet
I discussed how the opposition is expected to have more influence under minority cabinets
above, but to further account for the effect of being in minority, I will also use the
parliamentary basis (minority versus majority) of the cabinet as an explanatory variable.
Indeed, Norwegian majority cabinets on average retain office about one year longer than
minority cabinets – a pattern that is also found in most other parliamentary democracies
(Gallagher et al. 2011: 447). Berlinski et al. (2012: 83) found no effect of being in
majority on ministerial durability, but British cabinets treated in that study were mostly
majority cabinets. Hence, I expect that:
H3a: Ministers serving under minority cabinets are less durable than ministers
serving under majority cabinets.
A second cabinet attribute that is relevant in Norwegian politics is coalitions versus
single-party cabinets. I assume ministerial shirking and sabotage to be more frequent
in coalitions than in single-party cabinets because the policy positions diverge more in
coalitions (Bergman, Müller, Strøm and Blomgren 2003: 128), but very few coalition
cabinets terminate because of policy differences between parties (Bergman et al. 2003:
128). Hence, it is plausible to argue that coalition cabinets rather replace drifting ministers
than the more costly option of terminating the cabinet. Thus, the hypothesis regarding
cabinet composition reads as follows:
H3b: Ministers serving under coalition cabinets are less durable than ministers
serving under single-party cabinets.
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2.2.4 Personal characteristics
So far, I have covered performance, experience, and cabinet specific measures, but
individual non-political characteristics might also have an effect on durability and will
thus be controlled for.
Meserve, Pemstein and Bernhard (2009: 1030) use age as a proxy for career ambition,
and finds that younger members of the European Parliament are more likely to return to
national politics than their elder colleagues. Similarly, age can be used as a proxy for
career ambition within cabinets. The assumption is that the eldest ministers are not as
hungry as younger ministers, and therefore perform worse. Indeed, age has been found to
increase the likelihood of dismissal in Britain (Berlinski et al. 2012: 79), even though it
has been argued that there is no reason for age to have an effect on ministerial durability
(Dewan and Dowding 2005: 48). The hypothesis of age, based on the above assumption,
is straightforward:
H4a: Ministerial durability decrease with age.
Berlinski et al. (2012: 79) finds that female ministers sit safer than their male
counterparts, and Norwegian cabinets are "famous" for their high proportion of female
ministers (Narud and Strøm 2011: 228). Furthermore, the recruitment pool of women
has been, and still is, quite small in relation to men (Eilertsen 2014: 39-40), and women
are expected to at least occupy some of the posts in cabinet. Hence, women should be
expected to be more durable than men.
However, female ministers have often met more skepticism than men when entering
cabinet, especially from the 1940s throughout the 1970s. An interview by the Norwegian
Brodcasting Corporation (NRK) with the newly assigned Sissel Rønbeck in 1979
illustrates this latter point, when a hostile reporter asks her upon entering cabinet: "do
you have any knowledge of what this department really does?"3. As mentioned, media
studies on scandals in Norwegian politics have also hinted at women being more easily
demonized than men. It could thus be hypothesized that:
H4b1: Female ministers are less durable than male ministers
3The interview can be retrieved from http://tv.nrk.no/serie/tilbake-til-70-tallet#t=4m41s
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Elite theorist generally believe that privileged elites have greater access to political
power (Berlinski et al. 2012: 84), and British ministers with degrees from Oxford or
Cambridge are found to have safer positions within cabinets than ministers with lower
education (Berlinski et al. 2012: 79). The assumption is that education "capture some
inherent characteristics of the minister such as acquired skills, latent ability or access
to social networks" (Berlinski et al. 2012: 79). As for education in Norway, the country
ranks low among parliamentary democracies when it comes to education levels of cabinet
ministers (Narud and Strøm 2011: 229), although it is still quite high (see Chapter 4).
Based on the assumptions described above, the hypothesis reads as follows:
H4c: Ministers with lower education are more likely to be dismissed than ministers
with high education.
2.2.5 Reshuﬄes
Finally, cabinet reshuﬄes are used by principals as a tool for containing agency loss.
Kam and Indridason (2005: 354-355) finds that reshuﬄes are used as a strategic device
by the PM to dampen intracabinet conflicts. Ministerial reshuﬄes are thus assumed to
either be a promotion to a more prestigious position after performing well, or a demotion
to a less important post because dismissal is unwanted by the minister’s party leader.
As one of few that has investigated the relationship between tenure and reshuﬄes, Bucur
(2015: 119) finds evidence of reshuﬄes being used as an instrument of promotion in
France. The hypothesis regarding reshuﬄes is thus:
H5: Reshuﬄed ministers are less likely to be dismissed than ministers that remain in
the same post over the whole tenure.
24
3 | Norwegian cabinet anatomy
In this chapter, I will firstly discuss the history of the post-war period by focusing on
how the party system has developed from being dominated by the Labor Party to the
coalition based governments of the present. Secondly, I go more into depth on the the
cabinet as a collective, before I consider how the King, PM and party leaders influence
cabinet work. Thirdly, I discuss some structural rules for getting cabinet posts and some of
the responsibilities cabinet ministers have. Finally, I go over the main political parties in
post-war Norway and then elaborate on how ministerial work is affected by their parties.
Generally, it is important to stress that the constitutional role of Norwegian cabinets
is quite vague, and most of the tasks, roles, and powers it has are developed through
constitutional common law (Smith 2014: 121), making it difficult to point out general
assessments on cabinet anatomy; some aspects vary between cabinets and we generally
do not know which issues are discussed, how they are discussed, and how the outcome is
decided inside the cabinet.
3.1 Norwegian cabinet history
In line with Rasch (2004: 41), I record a new cabinet whenever there has been an election,
a change of parties in cabinet, or a change of PM. By using this counting method, there
are 30 cabinets in the period covered here – the number of cabinets across all cabinet party
compositions and parliamentary basis is shown in figure 3.1.1. The main picture is that
most cabinets in post-war Norway have been lead by the Labor Party, and that minority
and single-party cabinets are more frequent than majority and coalition cabinets. The
first six cabinets, as the only cases of majority single party cabinets, were lead by the
Labor Party. This is commonly labeled as the One Party State (Ettpartistaten), which
lasted until the fall of 1961, when the Labor Party lost majority in parliament. However,
the definite end of the era came when the Gerhardsen VI cabinet had to resign over its
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Figure 3.1.1: Cabinet composition and parliamentary basis.
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handling of a miner’s accident in the Kings Bay mines on Svalbard (Rokkan 1966: 70).
The newly formed Socialist People’s Party (now called Socialist Left Party), who had
two swing votes after the 1961 election, decided to vote in favor of a of a no-confidence
motion, leading to the resignation of Gerhardsen’s cabinet (Rokkan 1966: 71). Hence,
a new era with moderate pluralism – a bipolar system where two blocks makes up the
possible government formation alternatives – started (Sartori 1990: 336).
The transition to moderate pluralism also made way for coalition cabinets to form.
When Gerhardsen’s cabinet left office in 1963, the Lyng I cabinet was formed. This was the
first post-war coalition; a center-right constellation including the Høyre (Conservatives),
Kristelig folkeparti (Christian People’s Party), Venstre (Liberal Party), and Senterpartiet
(Centre Party). Though the Lyng I cabinet only lasted for 28 days, it was the start of a
period lasting till 2005 where all cabinets were either minority Labor Party or centre-right
coalitions (with exception of the Conservatives’s single-party minority cabinet under the
leadership of Kåre Willoch from 1981 to 1983). After the 2005 election, the Labor Party
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went into its first coalition as they formed a cabinet that lasted for eight years together
with the Socialist Left Party and Centre Party – a coalition popularly called the Red-Green
coalition. Finally, after the 2013 election, the Red-Green coalition lost its majority, and
the Conservatives went into negotiations with the Liberal Party, Christian People’s Party,
and the right wing Fremskrittspartiet (Progress Party). Eventually, a Blue-Blue coalition
between the Conservatives and Progress Party sitting on the mercy of the centrist Liberal
Party and Christian People’s Party was formed. As interesting as it might have been to
include this cabinet in the analysis, this latter cabinet falls out because it has not finished
its period yet.
3.2 Cabinet as a collective
The cabinet is formally recognized through article 12 of the Constitution, which states
that the Council of State should be a consist "of a prime minister and at least seven
other members" (Strøm 1994: 41). More specifically, the executive leadership lies with
the King, who is to take his decisions after hearing the advice of his Councilors (Eriksen
1997: 210). In practice, however, constitutional common law has made the King follow
"the advice of the outgoing prime minister in designating a formateur" (Strøm 1994: 41),
and he has not had any real influence over the formation process since 1905 (Rasch 2004:
101). As discussed in section 2.1.2, this means that the party leaders – consulted by other
party members – decide who to appoint for cabinet duties.
Because coalitions are quite frequent in Norway, a note on how posts are distributed
between the participating parties should be added. Narud (2000: 180-181) states that the
portfolio allocation in Norwegian coalition cabinets in the post-war period has followed a
universal pattern. The parties in the coalition gets a proportional amount of posts in the
cabinet relative to the number of seats they occupy in parliament – a practice often referred
to as Gamson’s law (Warwick and Druckman 2006: 635-636). Indeed, this was clearly
the case in the first three post-war coalition cabinets, where the posts were perfectly
proportional to parliamentary seats. However, there has been an increasing tendency
towards over-representing the small parties in the later governments. In the Stoltenberg
II and III cabinets, the Labor Party got four and three posts less than they would have
had with proportionality. Furthermore, the Conservatives fell one post short from perfect
proportionality in the Willoch II, Willoch III, and the Bondevik II governments, while it
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fell two posts short in the Syse I government. Overrepresentation of the smaller parties
could mean that ministers from these parties sit safer because smaller parties are also
expected to have fewer alternatives available in the recruitment pools (Saalfeld 2003:
353).
The cabinet convenes collectively in two different formats: cabinet meetings and King
in Council. On Mondays and Thursdays, ministers meet in collective cabinet meetings
where policy proposals are presented, discussed, and resolved (Strøm 1994: 41). The
King in Council meetings on Fridays are mainly ritualistic, but this is also where Royal
Resolutions (propositions for parliament) are formally signed by the King and PM (Strøm
1994: 41). Although disputes are resolved before the King in Council, the King can ask
detailed questions on the proposals. This is illustrated in a documentary on Norwegian
democracy from 1964, produced by NRK, where the Gerhardsen VII cabinet sits in
the King in Council. The documentary shows the Minister of Local Government, Jens
Haugland, nervously answering questions asked by the King on a compulsory arbitration
proposition1.
As the documentary exemplifies, ministers are responsible for the propositions
developed under their jurisdiction, and usually present them both in cabinet meetings
and King in Council. When several departments are involved in proposals, the relevant
ministers meet to talk and resolve potential disputes before presenting the policy proposals
(Strøm 1994: 45).
3.3 Cabinet leaders
In Chapter 2, I argued that party leaders can be seen as the main principal of cabinet
ministers. At first glance however, the PM has a fair amount of formal power in Norway:
the King and the PM has to sign all decisions by the King in Council, and the PM has
an additional vote when the King is absent (Eriksen 1997: 219). This means that both
the PM and the King has veto power on cabinet decisions, but in practice, this power
has never been used by the PM (Strøm 1994: 42). Not using the power does, on the
other hand, not mean that ministers do not have to position themselves according to it.
The King has, for example, threatened to veto a proposition for removal of article 4 –
stating that the King must have Christian faith – from the Constitution, which lead to
1http://tv.nrk.no/serie/norge-gjennom-150-aar/FOLA64002864/sesong-1/episode-5
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the withdrawal of the proposition (Lepperød 2008).
Furthermore, the PM has little formal power over her ministers and the Storting:
she can "request information from any cabinet member, but cannot issue orders,
change ministerial jurisdictions, dissolve Parliament, or, technically, dismiss ministers"
(Strøm 1994: 42). The PM’s strength has also varied somewhat between different
personalities, depended on popularity, party strength, parliament basis, and powerful
interest organizations (Eriksen 1997: 220). Einar Gerhardsen is regarded as one of the
post-war PMs with a lot of influence over his cabinets, and was described as a tough,
brutal and cynical leader when he did not get what he wanted (Borgen 1999: 291).
Similarly, Kåre Willoch and Gro Harlem Brundland are believed to have been PMs with
much power within their cabinets (Borgen 1999: 367, 387).
Despite the limited formal powers of the PM, she is still the head of the cabinet, and
has the only constitutional described position (Eriksen 1997: 219). The department of
the PM – the Office of the Prime Minister (Statsministerens kontor) – was established in
1956 and has remained quite small. Indeed, it was regular in pre-war cabinets to give the
PM an additional department (Eriksen 1997: 219-220). This standard was long gone at
the start of the period covered here, which means that the PM’s single role is to be the
head of the cabinet.
Literature on the role of party leaders in coalition cabinets is scarce, but they are
rarely left out of coalitions and usually occupy the PM chair in single-party cabinets.
Some exceptions do, however, occur. For example, after Audun Lysbakken resigned (see
Chapter 1) from the Stoltenberg III cabinet, the Socialist Left Party did not have their
party leader in a cabinet post. One particular attribute with coalition cabinets is the
subcommittee or inner cabinet, usually consisting of the party leaders and the Minister
of Finance (Strøm 1994: 50). The first inner cabinet was established in the Willoch II
cabinet to resolve policy disputes between parties, and all coalitions since have made
use of similar constructions (Kolltveit 2012: 32). However, Kolltveit (2012: 42) found,
when examining the inner mechanics of the Bondevik II, Stoltenberg II, and Stoltenberg
III cabinets, that there has been an increased concentration of power within coalition
cabinets towards the inner cabinet. If anything, this strengthens the argument that party
leaders can be regarded as the main principal of cabinet members from their party.
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3.4 Cabinet members
In contrast to Britain, the qualification requirements for ministerial posts in Norway
are fairly unrestricted. While British ministers must be elected to parliament to take up
cabinet posts, their Norwegian colleagues do not need to meet such requirements. Instead,
"it is considered much more desirable for cabinet members to have good interest-group
ties than to have parliamentary experience" (Strøm 1994: 43). Indeed, cabinet members
are constitutional restrained from holding cabinet office and occupy a seat in parliament
at the same time (Rasch 2004: 88). About half of the ministers in the post-war period
start in their post with no previous parliamentary experience, and the median number
of parliamentary periods for all cabinet members is one. This makes Norway one of
the parliamentary states with the least amount of experience with regard to previous
parliamentary positions for sitting ministers (Saalfeld 2000: 359).
In terms of ministerial responsibilities, most cabinet members in post-war Norway
have been head of their own departments, though there have also been a few ministers
without portfolio and some with specific responsibilities within one or several departments.
Eriksen (1997: 221) argues that ministers wear two hats: "they are members of the cabinet
as well as departmental heads". But, ministers are believed to generally give more effort
to their role as departmental leaders than the role as cabinet members (Eriksen 1997:
221). In some cases, and especially when heading particularly strong departments, the
minister might "go native" – policy preferences get moulded by the institution (Andeweg
2000: 391) – and start leisure-shirking and/or dissent-shirking.
3.5 Political parties
Norwegian cabinets are party cabinets; all ministers in post-war Norway have been
members of a party. At the end of the period treated in this thesis, there were seven
parties in the Storting. From left to right on the ideological scale, these are: Socialist Left
Party, Labor Party, Centre Party, Christian People’s Party, Liberal Party, Conservatives,
and Progress Party (Narud and Strøm 2011: 202) – all of whom have participated in
cabinet (though the Progress Party first participated in cabinet after the period covered
by this thesis). The cabinets have, as mentioned, mainly either been single-party Labor
Party cabinets, or center-right coalitions (Strøm 1994: 39).
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Normative studies on the existence of political parties are generally "overwhelmingly
positive about political parties having a stake in democratic governance" (Müller 2000:
312). Jones and Hudson (1998: 176) argues that this is the case because parties increase
efficiency (reduce transaction costs), meaning that they are more capable of making
decisions than individual representatives would be: in democratic systems where each MP
has to follow an every man for himself approach, bargaining would happen on an issue
to issue basis, where few members agree on any of them (Strøm 2003: 57). Furthermore,
Müller (2000: 314-316) argues that parties reduce collective action problems, because they
"establish an institutional arrangement – party organization – which allows the monitoring
of the other party members in order to ensure that they indeed contribute to the collective
goal".
Even though party leaders are seen as principals of ministers, the political parties
themselves also play a key role for the work of Norwegian ministers. However, it is
often difficult to assess the role of parties in parliamentary systems because they are
seldom mentioned explicitly in the constitution (Müller 2000: 310), but they play a
pivotal role in the political life of parliamentary democracy. For example, in Norwegian
general elections, voters vote on parties rather than individual politicians, and the parties
themselves prepare the lists of representatives from each constituency. There are ways for
voters to alter the lists by giving extra votes for candidates they like or rearrange the list
to their preference, but this rarely leads to any significant alterations (Narud and Valen
2007: 64-66).
Parties also play an important role in containing agency loss within cabinets.
Mostly this happens ex-ante through contract design, screening, and selection; the party
organization can groom its members through party activities to limit the possibility for
drifts, but also provide an arena for party members to prove themselves as loyal and
capable politicians. Additionally, ministers are embedded in their party through local
or national work, and hiring party members without long-standing positions within the
party has usually been frowned upon (Strøm 1994: 50). As for containing agency loss
ex-post, parties often rely on the party leader, who has better and more easily accessible
information than the party organization, to monitor ministers (Müller 2000: 328-329).
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4 | Methods and data
In this chapter, I start by going over some of the basics regarding event history analysis,
and especially the upsides and downsides with using the semi-parametric Cox PH model,
before I proceed by explaining how the data on ministers and resignation calls were
collected.
In the remaining part of the chapter, I provide variable operationalizations and basic
descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis. Furthermore, some bivariate
measures are given to get a better picture of how these variables look over time and
structural attributes. To match the structure from Chapter 2, I group these sections into
five types of attributes: performance, experience, cabinet specific, personal characteristics,
and reshuﬄes. Additionally, I add a short section on jurisdictions, which is used a frailty
term in the analyses.
4.1 Event history analysis
Luckily, studies on ministerial durability came along late enough to dodge the debate on
whether duration or dismissal is the most important thing to investigate, as happened in
the government survival literature during the 1990s (Laver and Shepsle 1998: 30); event
history analysis takes both into consideration. At the most general level, event history
analysis (or survival analysis) is a method for estimating how variables affect duration
and event1. One of the major benefits of event history analysis over more standard linear
regression models is that it takes censoring and truncation into consideration. Censoring,
which is especially relevant here, occurs when a unit survives until we stop recording it
(Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 16). In line with the cabinet counting rules discussed
in Chapter 3, I stop recording the minister’s duration whenever he survives until an
1In biostatistics, the event is often death and the duration is survival time (Box-Steffensmeier and
Jones 2004: 7). Here, the event is ministerial dismissal, and duration ministerial tenure.
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election, the PM is replaced, or the party composition of the cabinet changes. Hence,
all ministers that retain their post until one of these events occur are right-censored –
they are not observed as the same unit anymore, and if they remain in their position
after the change, their duration is reset. There are two reasons for doing this. Firstly,
individual ministerial dismissal is the only event type of interest in the thesis; ministers
that fall together with the cabinet is a different and, in this case, uninteresting event
type. Secondly, after one of the above described shifts, surviving ministers are seen as
successful, and should not contribute to the failure rate2. Some ministers are replaced
after these changes occur, and the reasons for such resignations could, among others,
be other/better job offers (Erik Brofoss became central bank governor after leaving his
cabinet post), retirement, or wanting to step down as politicians.
Furthermore, the Cox PH model is preferable to parametric models, such as the
Weibull model, because parametric models depend on assumptions about the shape of the
baseline hazard. That is, parametric survival models make different (dependent on the
model) assumptions about when the units of analysis are more at risk. There is no sensible
way of assuming when ministers are more at risk of being dismissed; they could be safe
today and dismissed tomorrow if, for example, some hidden action suddenly is revealed.
The Cox PH model dodges this prerequisite by leaving the baseline hazard undefined.
Furthermore, as table 4.2.1 shows, only 16% (98 units) are dismissed, meaning that the
remaining 527 ministers are right-censored. This puts even more restraints on the model
choice; with a high level of right-censoring, parametric models gets an inflated intercept.
Because the Cox PH model leaves the baseline hazard unspecified, also the intercept is
left unspecified (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 47). This marks one of the major
drawbacks with the Cox PH model; there is no way of assessing and predicting time with
the Cox PH model because the absence of the intercept makes all variable effects relative.
However, as the main interest here is how different factors affect ministerial durability,
not predicting duration, the Cox PH model is adequate.
The most important assumption in the Cox PH model is the proportional hazards
2As Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004: 18) notes, it is evident that right-censored units does not
contribute to the failure rate in the duality of the likelihood for the sampled observations in survival
analysis, where ti is observed until ti∗ and then right-censored:
L=
∏
ti≤t∗
f(ti)
∏
ti>t
∗
S(t∗i )
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assumption, which assumes that the hazard ratio of all independent variables are fixed over
the entire duration (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 48). I will discuss the proportional
hazard assumption in more practically terms when utilizing the Cox PH model in the next
chapter.
Finally, I include a frailty term for jurisdiction (department). Frailty terms are used
in event history analysis to account for groups that are more or less prone to "die" by
including a random effects term in the hazard (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 163) –
an approach that is parallel to standard random effects models.
4.2 Data collection
4.2.1 Ministers
The data3 used for the thesis can be split into two different sections: one for fixed
ministerial characteristics upon entering cabinet, and one for resignation calls. I collected
most of the fixed characteristics part of the data manually,4 and supplemented with
birthdays from the NSD-data on Norwegian ministers (Munkejord 2007). Previous
parliamentary experience and youth party experience was gathered from the study by
Eilertsen (2014), while cabinet level attributes, originally used in Rasch (2004), was
kindly shared by Bjørn Erik Rasch. The resignation call collection will be described
more thoroughly below, but descriptive statistics of the variables used in the thesis are
provided in table 4.2.1.
An important note is that the first post-war Minister of Defense, Jens Christian
Hauge, has been excluded from all analyses. The reason is simple; Hauge’s inclusion
in the model skewed the results heavily because he received eleven resignation calls in
his first period – almost double of the second highest occurrence of six resignation calls.
Hauge was met with much skepticism because he was young and had strong opinions on
how to modernize the military after the war. Especially after a fallout with four generals,
in what was coined the Hauge-Helset scandal (Verdens Gang 1948), Hauge received a
bunch of resignation calls. With Hauge included in the model the proportional hazard
assumption was always violated, and he was easily identified as an outlier. Additionally,
3The data and documentation is available either through https://github.com/martigso/
ministersNor, or for R-users by installing the package martigso/ministersNor directly from GitHub
4All the cabinets and their ministers can be easily accessed at http://www.regjeringen.no. Data
on education and gender was gathered https://www.stortinget.no/
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Table 4.2.1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Class N Mean St.Dev Min Median Max
Duration Numeric 625 615.107 376.998 6 580 1527
Event Dichotomy 625 0.157 - 0 0 1
Resignation calls (RC) Count 625 0.472 0.985 0 0 6
Time (logged) Numeric 625 3.193 1.435 -5.901 3.582 4.203
RC opposition Dichotomy 625 0.126 - 0 0 1
RC own party Dichotomy 625 0.077 - 0 0 1
RC newspaper Dichotomy 625 0.117 - 0 0 1
Cabinet exp. Numeric 625 1.841 2.59 0 0.523 17.199
Parl. exp Dichotomy 625 0.478 - 0 0 1
Youth exp. (central) Dichotomy 625 0.083 - 0 0 1
Youth exp. (local) Dichotomy 625 0.194 - 0 0 1
Cabinet type (majority) Dichotomy 625 0.371 - 0 0 1
Cabinet structure (coalition) Dichotomy 625 0.382 - 0 0 1
Age Numeric 625 49.035 8.098 29 49 73
Gender (female) Dichotomy 625 0.267 - 0 0 1
Education (lower) Dichotomy 625 0.19 - 0 0 1
Reshuﬄe Dichotomy 625 0.067 - 0 0 1
PMs are excluded because they, as a consequence of recording new cabinets after a change
of PM, only fall together with the cabinet, and never individually.
4.2.2 Resignation calls
Due to a lack of a detailed description on the resignation call collection in similar studies,
the framework for the collection here is quite independent. A resignation call is, similar
to Berlinski et al. (2012), seen as questions asked by any actor that a minister should
resign, as reported in the newspaper Verdens Gang. This means that whenever an actor
– both political and non-political – demands that a minister should resign, I record it as
a resignation call against that minister. Furthermore, I record the resignation calls into
categories for which actors they came from. Firstly, resignation calls from the opposition
were recorded whenever a member of the opposition in parliament asked the minister to
resign. Secondly, resignation calls from the minister’s own party was recorded whenever a
member of a cabinet party asked for the minister’s dismissal. Finally, I record a resignation
call as coming from the newspaper when an editorial or author of an article demands that
a minister should be dismissed.
Ideally, more than one newspaper should have been used for cross-reference, but three
main limitations contributed to only using Verdens Gang for collecting resignation calls:
the paper has been political independent throughout the post-war period; it is the only
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paper that is easily accessible with good search mechanics all the way back to 1945; and,
it has been identified in media studies as the main initiator of political scandals (Allern
and Pollack 2009: 200), which makes it especially suitable for the purpose at hand.
Luckily, compared to the resignation call studies discussed in Chapter 2, the
newspaper I use is available digitally, through the well-functioning media search engine
ATEKST provided by Retriever. A list of eighteen key words – found in appendix A – was
developed before the collection was started. The search strings consist of the minister’s
surname combined with all of these key words one by one. Indeed, the whole resignation
call collection involved reading over ten thousand articles, making this an important but
very time consuming task. To make the collection as open as possible, I included a short
description of each resignation call and links to the articles they occurred in as columns
in a separate data set – though a license at Retriver is necessary for opening the links5.
4.3 Variable operationalization
4.3.1 Duration and event
The dependent variable in this analysis is a combination of ministerial duration and
ministerial dismissal. Ministerial duration is measured as the difference in days between
start and stop of each minister from the start of the cabinet (see table 4.3.1). Table 4.2.1
shows that duration has a lot of variation – ranging from 6 days to 1 527 days, with
a mean of 615 days. The event variable is dichotomous, where dismissed ministers are
coded as 1 and right-censored ministers are coded as 0. As discussed, only 16% of the
625 units in the data lost their post due to dismissal.
Some special cases are also worth mentioning. Actual deaths are fairly straightforward
to right-censor6, because of their non-political nature, but leaves of absence pose a possible
threat to the analysis: should these ministers be right-censored, or handled as dismissals
that get a fresh start when they come back from a leave of absence? Or should their
duration be summed up into one, excluding the period they were absent? I worked around
this problem by recording two rows for these units with the cabinet start as origin, giving
the data a (start, stop] structure (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 100-101). Two
5These data are also available at https://github.com/martigso/ministersNor, or through the
R-package martigso/ministersNor from GitHub.
6Five ministers are right censored because of death: Olav Bruvik (1962), Knut Frydenlund (1987),
Sonja Ludvigsen (1974), Sven Oftedal (1948), Johan Jørgen Holst (1993)
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examples from the data can illustrate the data structure:
Table 4.3.1: Extract of the data
Last name Start End Duration Cabinet start Cabinet end
1 Fjeld 1945-11-05 1947-12-06 ( 0, 761+] 1945-11-05 1950-01-10
2 Fjeld 1948-03-06 1950-01-10 (852,1527+] 1945-11-05 1950-01-10
3 Storberget 2009-10-21 2011-01-01 ( 0, 437+] 2009-10-21 2013-09-30
4 Storberget 2011-03-31 2011-11-11 (526, 751] 2009-10-21 2013-09-30
The first two rows of table 4.3.1 represents the Minister of Agriculture, Kristian Fjeld,
in the first Gerhardsen cabinet after the war. Fjeld was reported to struggle both with bad
health and getting his views taken seriously by the Minister of Finance, Brofoss (Verdens
Gang 1947). The combination of these factors lead him to take a three months long leave
of absence, before re-entering the cabinet and sitting throughout the period. The third
and fourth row represents Knut Storberget’s ministerial duties under the Stoltenberg III
cabinet. Storberget went into a paternity leave at the start of 2011 that ended on the
last day of March the same year. As Minister of Justice, Storberget was under heavy fire
for the lack of emergency preparedness of the police after the July 22 terrorist attacks,
and resigned in mid November. The most important thing to notice here is the duration
variable: for the first record of both ministers the cabinet start date is identical with
their individual start date, making the start of the duration variable 0. Both Fjeld and
Storberget then took a leave of absence after 761 and 437 days, respectively, and the plus
sign marks that the ministers are right censored. Hence, the two leaves of absence and
Fjeld’s second row (for sitting throughout the Gerhardsen II cabinet) are right-censored.
Storberget did not survive the full cabinet time, and his dismissal is therefore recorded
as an event (no plus sign). Consequently, row 1, 2, and 3 contribute only to the survival
rate, while row 4 contributes to the failure rate as well.
With high requirements for dismissal, it is unsurprising that there are more
right-censored units in the data than events. This is illustrated in figure 4.3.1, where
the light cyan line shows that most cabinets have had between zero and nine resignations.
One cabinet – Nordli II – stands out as an exception with 14 dismissals. This was in
most part a consequence of Nordli wanting to position "his own people", rather than the
previous members of the Bratteli II cabinet. It is also interesting that all cabinets with
no ministerial dismissals are minority cabinets and mostly short lived (Lyng I, Bratteli
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Figure 4.3.1: Number of forced exits and censored ministers across cabinets.
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II, Nordli I, Brundland I, and Willoch I). The dark line of figure 4.3.1 also displays the
amount of right-censored units in each cabinet, which gives a good picture of the small
but steady increase in number of portfolios over the period.
4.3.2 Performance
Berlinski et al. (2010: 561) states that principals should reward or punish their agents
according to their general performance; a minister not performing to the principal’s
expectations is likely to get the axe sooner, rather than later. But how can ministerial
performance be measured?
As discussed, a common way to measure performance of ministers is through
resignation calls; Berlinski et al. (2012: 2010), Bucur (2013: 2015), and Fischer et al.
(2006) all use resignation calls for measuring performance, albeit in different ways. Firstly,
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Berlinski et al. (2010) has a general approach, arguing that when "[...] someone in
Parliament, media, or some nonpolitical organization suggests the minister should resign,
then it is defined as a ‘resignation call’ " (Berlinski et al. 2010: 559). Secondly, Bucur
(2013: 79-80) argues that there are four reasons to call for a minister’s resignation:
personal errors, departmental errors, policy disagreements, and breaches of collective
responsibility by challenging a cabinet decision. However, pooled resignation calls are
mainly used in the analyses. Lastly, Fischer et al. (2006: 713) use the term resignation
discussions for resignation calls in their analysis of ministerial resignations in Germany.
Their approach involves using a filtering mechanism of only considering the first two
pages of the Frankfurter Allgemine Zeitung. The base for all these studies, however, is
that someone questions whether the minister should continue in his post or not, and
that this will tear on the principal’s patience with the minister; ministers are found to
be held accountable for not performing well. There is, of course, a difference between
being criticized by any actor through the media and being sacked for bad performance –
a minister might get several resignation calls, but the firing principal will still be the one
to decide whether the infringement is big enough to sack the minister. However, as the
inner mechanics of the cabinets are mostly hidden from the public, resignation calls can
to some degree measure the minister’s performance.
Particular for the resignation call measure is that it is an event variable: resignation
calls are recorded during the tenure, whereas the other variables are observed when the
minister is hired. The pooled resignation call measure has, as table 4.2.1 shows, a range
between 0 and 6 resignation calls, and that the average minister gets just under a half
resignation call during his tenure. However, the measure is skewed towards zero; 74% of
the ministers have no resignation calls, and 89% have less than two resignation calls.
The points in figure 4.3.2 display the mean number of resignation calls for
non-resignations and forced exits across all post-war cabinets, while the lines show the
loess smoothed number of resignation calls over non-resignations and forced exits. Since
this method will be used on several occasions, a brief explanation is necessary. The loess
smoothing method adds a locally fitted regression line to the data by considering the
values of yi and xi at several of the neighbors of xi on x (Beck and Jackman 1998: 603),
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Figure 4.3.2: Mean number of resignation calls across cabinets and forced exits.
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leading to a curved smooth line.7
The points of figure 4.3.2 shows that there is a lot of variation in the mean amount of
resignation calls between cabinets. However, the loess curve shows that, in the immediate
post-war period, the mean dismissed and censored ministers generally had under a half
resignation call. Onwards, the censored ministers generally get less and less resignation
calls until the Korvald I cabinet, while dismissed ministers get more resignation calls.
From the last Willoch cabinet to the present, resignation calls for dismissed ministers
have risen quite sharply, while the curve for surviving ministers flattens out at over a
half resignation call. At the very end of the period, dismissed ministers generally have
just under two resignation calls, while the surviving ministers generally receive well under
one resignation call. It is quite interesting that there is both more divergence between
resignation calls for ministers that are and are not dismissed, and that there are more
7How much the curve shifts depends on the amount of the neighbors are considered – how many
neighbors on xi±1 that is taken into consideration on xi. All plots used in this thesis applies a proportion
of 0.75, allowing quite sharp turns in the curve.
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resignation calls overall in the later cabinets. This will, of course, be discussed in the next
chapter.
In extension of the pooled resignation call measure, I will explore whether the origin
of the resignation call reveal more specific patters of when ministers are held accountable.
The resignation calls are then divided up into groups according to who gave them: the
opposition, newspapers, or the minister’s own party. Resignation calls from the opposition
are recorded whenever a member of one or more opposing parties in parliament demands a
minister’s resignation. Resignation calls that are found in editorials or speculations within
newspaper articles constitute the newspaper category, while both calls for resignation by
ones own party or a coalition partner are coded in the own party category. The pooled
resignation call measure does, of course, include these resignation calls in addition to those
from constituencies, experts, organizations, opinion polls, and more. However, these latter
categories occurred too infrequently to handle as their own categories.
In figure 4.3.3, each minister is represented by one dot on each of the resignation call
categories on the x-axis, while the y-axis shows boxes for the number of resignation calls
in said categories. It is pretty clear that only pooled resignation calls have the necessary
variation to be treated as a continuous variable here: the main bunch of ministers get no
resignation calls, but a fair group also gets one and two during their tenure. Moving up
the ladder, the points are more scarce, until the max of six resignation calls which were
received by two ministers – Riis-Johansen in the Stoltenberg III cabinet, and Berget in
the Brundtland IV cabinet.
The opposition, newspaper, and own party categories do not have the same amount of
variation. Only 13% of the ministers have received resignation calls from the opposition,
8% from ones own party, and 12% from newspapers. There are a fair amount of ministers
with one resignation call in each of them, but far less with two or more, compared to the
pooled measure. Hence, to not violate the proportional hazards assumption in the Cox
PH model, I recode these into dichotomous variables and interact them with the logged
function of time for further analysis.8 The time interaction variable is a bit unorthodox
in survival analysis terms because it is the logged time difference between the date the
minister started his cabinet duties and 1945. The reason for this approach is that I expect
the opposition to have more influence after the One Party State and that newspapers give
8I also ran models with these categories as continuous variables in separate analysis, but they did in
fact violate the proportional hazards assumption.
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Figure 4.3.3: Resignation calls from different actors.
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more resignation calls the closer to the present we go. Also, figure 4.3.2 gave the impression
of resignation calls being more frequent in the latest part of the period.
Finally, there are some methodological problems associated with the use of resignation
calls as a performance measure: they are at best proxies for performance, they vary in
seriousness, their reliability can be low, and more. This will be discussed more thoroughly
in the section 6.2 and Chapter 7.
4.3.3 Experience
As for political experience, both Berlinski et al. (2012) and Bucur (2013) control for
previous cabinet experience, but use dummies to estimate this effect. There is no
theoretical reason to argue that a minister with one year of experience will benefit as
much from his experience as a minister with 10 years of cabinet duties on his back. Also,
this variable is already latent in the data, and take no time to gather. Therefore, I measure
cabinet experience in years by using the cumulative lagged duration of each minister. In
other words, cabinet experience is the number of years a minister has been in previous
cabinets upon entering the new cabinet. The variable has a range from zero to over 17
43
4.3. Variable operationalization
years, with a mean of 1.8 years. Because just over half of the ministers in the data have
previous experience upon entering cabinet, the median is much lower – at about a half
year.
As discussed in Chapter 2, cabinet experience could be expected to decrease the
probability of getting fired at face value. However, I also discussed how ministers with
cabinet experience are found to be more likely to leave office than minister with no
experience in other studies. Figure 4.3.4 displays the mean and loess smoothed curve
for previous cabinet experience of dismissed and censored ministers over the cabinets
covered by the data. The experience is quite low in both categories for the first post-war
Gerhardsen cabinet, which is natural considering new politicians were to a large degree
entering national politics. The amount of experience raises quite sharply during the One
Party State, indicating the cabinet stableness of the period; few ministers were replaced,
and cabinet composition never changed. The curve is, however, somewhat lower because
of the inexperienced Lyng I and Borten I cabinets. Experience is generally higher among
the dismissed ministers (peaking at about 3.5 years in the early 1960s) than successful
Figure 4.3.4: Cabinet experience across cabinets and forced exits.
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ministers (peaking at under 2 years in the late 1950s). Once the Lyng I coalition entered
office, the shifts between Labor Party and non-socialist coalitions started, and experience
naturally fell steadily as a consequence. Mean previous cabinet experience is remarkably
stable from Korvald I to the end of the period, with only some low laying points (Willoch I,
Brundtland II and Bondevik I) and a few high points, especially with regard to dismissed
ministers (Nordli II, Willoch III, Brundland IV, and Stoltenberg I).
I also mentioned in section 2.2 that parliamentary experience was not included in the
Berlinski et al. (2012) study and that Bucur (2013) finds some conflicting evidence of
parliamentary experience having an effect on tenure. Here, parliamentary experience is
coded as a dichotomous variable scoring 1 for ministers with parliamentary experience and
0 for ministers with no parliamentary experience. Recall that parliamentary experience
among cabinet members is low in Norway. Indeed, as table 4.2.1 shows, just under 50%
of the ministers have experience from parliament upon entering cabinet. Arguably, this
variable could have been used as a continuous variable, similarly to the cabinet experience
variable, but this method proved highly ineffective with regard to the proportional hazards
assumption of the Cox PH model.
Figure 4.3.5 presents the number of ministers with and without parliamentary
experience upon entering cabinet over forced exits and censored ministers, while the
text indicates how many percent each bar represents relative to the total amount of
Figure 4.3.5: Parliamentary experience for censored ministers and forced exits.
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unique cabinet ministers in the data. It is evident that ministers with some parliamentary
experience has about the same dismissal rate as their colleagues without experience, and
that there is an approximate equal split in total between ministers with and without
parliamentary experience.
The youth experience variable is a dichotomous measure, scoring one for experience
(local or central/national) and zero for no experience. One issue with this variable is
that the measure was only recorded for ministers with previous parliamentary experience.
Hence, these are the hardcore party members that have been members since young age,
risen through the party, eventually getting MP status, and finally getting a shot at cabinet
duties.
Figure 4.3.6 displays the percent of youth party experience throughout the period
within each party. The immediate thing to notice here is that the total (gray) and local
(black) bars are at equal levels for all parties except for the Christian People’s Party and
Socialist Left Party. This means that, for the remaining parties, all cabinet members
Figure 4.3.6: Mean youth party experience across parties.
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with youth experience have been members of a local youth organization, and that all
ministers from these parties with experience from the central youth organization also
have experience at the local level.
Furthermore, around 20% or more of the cabinet members in all parties (except the
Centre Party) have had parliamentary and some youth party experience. The Labor Party
has a surprisingly low proportion of cabinet members with central youth party experience
(under 5%), which could mean that there is a high degree of power centralization among
a small number of members, but this question goes beyond the scope of this thesis.
4.3.4 Cabinet characteristics
Even though all cabinets have the confidence of parliament as long as they are in position,
parliamentary basis is likely to play a major role for cabinets and their ability to introduce
wanted policies. In Chapter 2, I reviewed some of the findings in the cabinet survival
literature, where evidence suggest that single-party and cabinets with majorities behind
them in parliament are likely to survive longer than coalition and minority cabinets.
Both the cabinet composition and parliamentary basis variables are dichotomous, where
the cabinet type variable takes the value 1 for ministers in majority governments and 0
for those in minority governments. The cabinet structure variable is coded 1 for coalitions
and 0 for single-party cabinets.
Figure 4.3.7 visualizes the number of ministers across the post-war period (gray bars)
and number of dismissed ministers (black bar) over cabinet type and structure. Two
patterns are interesting here. Firstly, majority cabinets have more dismissals per minister
than minority cabinets. In single-party majority cabinets (the One Party State), over
half of the ministers were fired, while 32% were dismissed in coalition majority cabinets.
Secondly, minority coalitions have a substantially lower dismissal rate than all other
compositions. This could, of course, be a consequence of coalitions being able to select
only their best politicians. However, this does not explain minority single-party coalitions
having a lower dismissal rate than majority coalitions. Cabinet duration, on the other
hand, does provide a plausible explanation; minority coalition cabinets generally sit for a
shorter amount of time than the other composition alternatives. Shorter cabinet duration
means less time to engage in moral hazard, which in turn gives less time for dismissals.
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Figure 4.3.7: Cabinet type over number of forced exits and total ministers.
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4.3.5 Personal characteristics
Age
In Chapter 2, I justified controlling for age by arguing that it is a proxy for career
ambition. However, using proxies can pose problems. Occupying a post in cabinet is
a tiring task; ministers (mostly) have responsibility for an entire department, are under
constant pressure from media, face demands from the population, and receive criticism
from the opposition. It is sensible to argue that these stressful conditions could take
its toll on any person, and older persons are more prone to getting sick than younger
people. Indeed, a fair number of ministerial dismissals is caused by failing health. But, it
is difficult to separate real health related dismissals from alleged health related dismissals.
Two examples might illustrate this point. For example, in May 1948, the Minister of
Social Affairs, Sven Oftedal, went into a leave of absence after having health problems.
A month later, he died of a heart attack only 43 years old (Johnsen 2009). Similarly, in
mid June 2008, Åslaug Haga, the Minister of Petroleum and Energy, also took a leave of
absence for health related issues, only to withdraw from her position six days after. In
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the run-up to Haga’s leave, a series of newspaper articles uncovered that she had illegally
rented out a small storehouse. Whether the resignation came as a consequence of the
leave or because of the "scandal" is impossible to know. Neither is it possible to certainly
assert the differences between these two types of dismissals. Hence, inferences based on
the age variable should be handled with caution – we are not totally sure that ambition
is the only thing it measures.
Figure 4.3.8: Mean and loess smoothed age over cabinets.
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The age variable is recorded when the minister enters cabinet, has a mean of 49 years,
and spans from the youngest minister, Hadia Tajik, 29 years old, to the oldest minister,
Johan Ulrik Olsen at 73 years old. Figure 4.3.8 shows the mean age within each cabinet
(points) and the loess smoothed trend curve for censored and dismissed ministers. It
is clear from the plot that dismissed ministers generally are older than the surviving
ministers. There is also some variation across time, with ministers in the first half of the
period generally being older than those in the second half.
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Figure 4.3.9: Percentage of female cabinet ministers in each cabinet.
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Gender
The dichotomous gender variable is coded with males as the reference category. Table
4.2.1 shows that 73% of the ministers in the post-war period are male, but that number
does not reflect the whole story.
As figure 4.3.9 shows, the amount of women in each cabinet has risen throughout the
period treated here, peaking at approximately 50% female ministers in the Stoltenberg
II cabinet. However, in the earlier periods, women were severely underrepresented –
occupying one or two posts in each cabinet until the Korvald I cabinet. As discussed in
Chapter 2, women are expected to be more prone to dismissal. Hostility towards women
(especially in early periods) could make their position less safe in cabinet.
Education
The education variable has is coded according to two levels: 0 for higher education,
which is university degrees or higher, and 1 for lower education, which is less education
than a university degree. The reason for the crude categorization is that the register on
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stortinget.no has limited information on some of the ministers, but more exhaustive
on other. The measure can, however, not be better than its weakest link.
The big majority of ministers in the period has higher education. As figure 4.3.10
shows, of the 597 unique cabinet ministers, 474 have higher education upon entering office,
while only 123 have lower education. Typically, low education ministers have special sector
experience that reflect the post they are occupy. For example, the Ministry of Fisheries
has had a tradition of being lead by fishermen, such as Reidar Carlsen (1945-1951), Eivind
Bolle (1973-1981), and Peter Angelsen (1997-2000).
The black bars in figure 4.3.10 represents the number of ministers with higher and
lower education who were dismissed, with percentage of the total in text above the bar. 79
ministers with higher education resigned before the cabinet stopped, and only 21 of their
colleagues with lower education met the same fate. However, the percentage of ministers
dismissed as a product of the total amount of ministers with each education is virtually
the same – roughly around 18%.
Figure 4.3.10: Number of ministers with higher and lower education.
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4.3.6 Reshuﬄes
In Chapter 2, I discussed how reshuﬄes can be expected to both increase and decrease
the chance of dismissal. The variable is coded as 1 for ministers that have been reshuﬄed
within the same cabinet as they hold their current post, and 0 otherwise. Table 4.2.1
shows that only 7% (42 ministers) have been reshuﬄed during the period.
Figure 4.3.11: Number of reshuﬄes across PMs and mean minister duration.
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Figure 4.3.11 displays the number of reshuﬄes under different PMs and the mean
minister duration represented by color tones where lighter colors are short durations and
darker colors are longer durations. As could be expected, cabinets where ministers on
average have long tenures also generally have more reshuﬄes. The short lived Lyng,
Korvald, and Syse cabinets represent this trend perfectly with no reshuﬄes, whereas
Bondevik is the only non-socialist PM with more than three reshuﬄes under his belt,
having reshuﬄed six times over his two cabinets. Stoltenberg is the PM with most
reshuﬄes, having replaced ten ministers across the three cabinets he lead. However, the
most surprising thing to gather from figure 4.3.11 is that only one minister was reshuﬄed
across the two Borten cabinets, because the average minister within these two cabinets
sat for almost 800 days.
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4.3.7 Jurisdiction
The last variable to consider is the minister’s jurisdiction. The variable is, as mentioned,
added as a shared frailty term to control for unobserved heterogeneity. More plainly,
the idea is that some jurisdictions are more prone for dismissals than others. Because
departments are restructured, discontinued, and established steadily across the period,
I assign all department titles (37) to 16 categories (see table B.1 in the appendix).
Assignment to each category was done by examining which departments succeeded those
that were discontinued and by assessing their responsibilities.
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5 | Ministerial durability analysis
In this chapter, I will show the results from two Cox PH models; one where resignation
calls are pooled, and one where I divide resignation calls into categories for the actors in
which they came from. I focus the first section on the pooled resignation call model, and
the second section on the actor-based resignation call model. Both sections are structured
as follows: I start by discussing the model as a whole by interpreting the point estimates,
before I go through the most interesting findings in detail through visualizing the effects
in hazard ratio plots.
The main focus will be on the uncertainty of the estimates in both analyses through
confidence intervals, rather than exclusively on statistical significance. All the regression
models are printed in coefficient plots, supplemented by tables in appendix C. It is
important to remember throughout this chapter that the Cox PH model is relative; the
main focus is to assess whether some characteristics make ministers more or less durable,
not on tenure length.
5.1 Pooled performance
As I expect resignation calls to increase the likelihood of ministerial dismissal, the natural
start of the analysis is to estimate the effect of the pooled resignation call measure.
Figure 5.1.1 shows the hazard rate point estimates and their respective 95% confidence
intervals for the pooled resignation call Cox PH model. The hazard rate is a conditional
probability rate, which gives the rate at which units fail by a time t, given that the
unit has survived until t (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 13-14). At a general level,
positive coefficients indicate decreasing survival time and negative coefficients increasing
survival time (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 50). Notice, as discussed above, that
there is no intercept in Cox PH models. The frailty variance of the jurisdiction variable
is estimated at 0.153 (15.3%), meaning that some unobserved heterogeneity is accounted
55
5.1. Pooled performance
Figure 5.1.1: Pooled resignation call model.
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for, while the proportional hazard test is insignificant for all variables and gives a global
p-value of 0.932. This means that we quite certainly can assess that there is no evidence
of non-proportionality1.
The pooled resignation call measure does, as expected, increase the hazard for
ministerial dismissal, and its confidence interval is by some margin not crossing zero.
This means that we are quite certain that the effect is indeed positive, and that ministers
receiving resignation calls are more prone to dismissal. With a point estimate of 0.247,
the hazard – probability to be dismissed at ti+1 for the units that have survived until ti –
1For proportional hazards test of all variables, see table D.1 in the appendix.
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is expected to increase with 28.1%2 for a minister with one resignation call relative to a
minister with no resignation calls. Further, ministers that get two and three resignation
calls have an increased hazard of 64.0% and 110.1% respectively, compared to ministers
with no resignation calls. This gives quite clear support for H1a – ministers are generally
held accountable by their party leader when they receive resignation calls – and the
null-hypothesis can safely be disregarded.
Similarly, the estimate for previous cabinet experience increases the hazard for
ministers, and has a confidence interval not crossing zero. With a point estimate of
0.14, the model predicts that a minister with one year of previous cabinet experience is
12.1% more likely to face dismissal than ministers with no previous cabinet experience.
Additionally, a minister with experience from a full cabinet duration of four years is
expected to have 57.8% higher hazard than ministers without cabinet experience. This is
much in line with the findings of Berlinski et al. (2012) and H2a, described in Chapter 2.
The dummy for previous parliament experience – with no parliamentary experience
as the reference category – has the opposite effect of cabinet experience, and a confidence
interval that does not cross zero. Hence, H2b is supported in the data. The reasons for
these results will be discussed below. For now it should be noted that the point hazard
rate estimate (-0.658) for parliamentary experience suggest that these ministers are 48.2%
less likely to be dismissed than ministers without parliamentary experience.
The last experience variables – youth party experience among previous MP members
– are both associated with large uncertainties. Having experience from the central youth
organization is expected to increase durability, but the uncertainties are way too large
to be certain of the effect. Local experience, however, has a non-zero crossing confidence
interval, with the effect indicating that such experience makes ministers more prone to
dismissal. Nevertheless, from figure 4.3.6 in Chapter 4, we know that almost all ministers
with central experience also have local experience. This means that the diverging effects
between these variables are given by a small number of ministers. Also, the uncertainties
of the local experience variable are very large, and the effect is (as will be shown in section
6.2) not stable across models. I therefore argue that the null-hypothesis regarding both
variables should stand, and H2c rejected.
2Formula for relative change in hazard: 100∗ [ expβX1−expβX2
expβX2
] = 100∗ [ exp0.247∗0−exp0.247∗1
exp0.247∗0 ] = 28.1%
(Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 60)
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Both cabinet specific attributes estimates have confidence intervals crossing zero by a
good margin, making the null-hypotheses stand for both variables. Minority and coalition
cabinet ministers are, by the point estimate, expected to sit safer than those in majority
and single-party cabinets, which is the opposite of the expectations of H3a and H3b.
These are, however null-findings, and will be discussed thoroughly in Chapter 7.
Age, on the other hand, has one of the strongest and least uncertain effects. The
coefficient for age is positively signed, meaning that the older a minister is, the more likely
he is to face dismissal. A one point increase is estimated (0.059) to rise the hazard by
6.1%. This is not too impressive with a one unit increase, but recall that the age variable
spans from 29 years old to 73 years old. Hence, a minister at age 45 when entering cabinet
has a 81.1% higher hazard than a minister at age 35, which is a substantial increase in
the chance of getting the axe.
Lastly, gender, education, and reshuﬄes have large confidence intervals crossing zero
by a fair margin. Women are, with the point estimate, expected to sit less safe than
men, ministers with higher education slightly shorter than those with lower education,
and reshuﬄed ministers sit safer than ministers remaining in their post. However, the
uncertainty connected to these estimates makes it impossible to draw valid inferences
from them – the null-hypotheses stands for all of them.
In the next section, I will go more thoroughly through the most interesting findings
of this section. Again, it is important to note that the Cox PH model is a relative risk
model. There is no way of retrieving absolute risk or predicted duration based on it,
but predicted relative risk – the predicted risk of termination in one group compared to
another – is fully possible. I will focus the next section on plotting the effects in hazard
ratios, which is the relative hazard between what in medical analyses is called treatment
group compared to a control group – that is not to say that the approach is an experiment
design, which is closely related to these terms, but rather a way of visualizing the results
of Cox PH models.
By default (and unchangeable), all variables in the control group are set to their mean
when using this method in R (Therneau 2015). This is reasonable for numeric variables,
but for factors it means that the control group has values not found in reality (the variable
means can be found in table 4.2.1). The problem is, however of minor importance as
all the factors used here are either skewed towards 0 or 1 or are associated with large
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uncertainties. Also, the main interest is to see how the hazard changes across values of
one variable, when all other variables are held constant, not comparison between groups.
For the treatment group – or what I call comparison group here – the most representative
values are used as the basis (unless other specs are specified): an unshuﬄed 49 year
old male with higher education, zero resignation calls, and no experience from either
parliament, previous cabinets or youth organization, sitting in a minority single-party
cabinet. The control group will always be represented by a horizontal dashed line across
the hazard ratio 1, but this is, as mentioned, not too important as the main interest is
the effect of the variable that is set to vary within the comparison group.
5.1.1 Resignation calls
Figure 5.1.2 shows the hazard ratios for the comparison group with a 0 to 5 variation on
resignation calls, relative to the control group (dashed horizontal line).
Figure 5.1.2: Effect of resignation calls.
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Most importantly, figure 5.1.2 tells that the more resignation calls one gets, the higher
the hazard of ministerial dismissal is. The estimated hazard ratio with two resignation
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calls lies around 1.5, indicating that the comparison minister surviving until any time ti
with two resignation calls is approximately 50% more likely to be dismissed at ti+1 than
the control group minister. The hazard of three resignation calls is almost double that of
the control group, and it peaks at five resignation calls where ministers are 3 times more
likely to be dismissed.
The finding is clearly confirming the point estimate finding: with resignation calls as a
performance measure, the underperforming ministers are more likely to be fired than the
better performing ministers, and the effect is quite strong. The chain of accountability is
working, which is good news for Norwegian parliamentarism.
5.1.2 Experience
In extension of the argument proposed by Narud and Valen (2001) that the longer a
cabinet sits the more likely it is to lose support, I argue that ministers with long service
time in previous cabinets are more likely to be dismissed. Indeed, as figure 5.1.3 shows,
the longer experience a minister has from previous cabinet the higher is the likelihood of
getting the axe.
Recall that the control group is the mean on all variables, and the mean of cabinet
Figure 5.1.3: Effect of previous cabinet experience.
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experience is just under 2 years. Hence, it is unsurprising that the hazard for ministers
with no experience is lower than the control group here. However, as our comparison
minister reaches 5 years, the hazard is 50% higher than the control group estimation,
and ministers with 10 years experience just over 2.5 times higher hazard than the control
group. However, it should also be noted that over 50% of the ministers have less than one
year previous experience, which is also indicated by the sparse rug and ever expanding
confidence bands at the higher values of experience (the reason for stopping at 10 years,
even though the max is 17 years).
This is, as mentioned above, in line with the findings of Bucur (2013) and Berlinski
et al. (2012): experience from previous cabinets does not decrease the likelihood of
dismissal, rather the contrary.
Two things are interesting with regard to the effect of parliamentary experience, shown
in figure 5.1.4. Firstly, ministers with parliamentary experience before entering cabinet
are expected to be half as likely to be dismissed relative to the control group. Secondly,
the hazard decreases sharply when going from the comparison minister with no experience
to the comparison minister with some experience. The confidence bands are, however,
quite large. Thus, the effect of parliamentary experience should be treated with caution;
Figure 5.1.4: Effect of parliamentary experience.
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it is not very clear that ministers with one parliamentary period is less likely to be fired
than those with no parliamentary experience when all other variables are held constant,
because the confidence band for the comparison minister with no experience is crossed by
the upper band of the comparison minister with experience.
5.2 Actor influence
The next step in the analysis is to go deeper into the nature of resignation calls; does
it matter where they come from? Figure 5.2.1 lists the coefficients of both model 1,
described and analyzed above, and model 2 where the pooled resignation call measure
is replaced with the three most common sources of resignation calls: the opposition, the
Figure 5.2.1: Actor-based and pooled resignation call models.
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ministers own party, and newspapers, together with logged time interactions. The reason
for interacting the actor-based resignation calls with time is that these variables proved
non-proportional by themselves.
The first thing to notice is that the experience and personal characteristic variables are
stable between the two models. The effect of cabinet type and structure have changed sign,
but the uncertainty is still too big to make anything close to decisive inferences on these
variables. The frailty term for jurisdiction is somewhat higher at 0.176 (17.6% variance),
and the proportional hazards test is still not significant, though with a lower global value of
0.6993. I will thus focus on the model 2 exclusive variables in this section: the interactions
between time and the three actor-based resignation call measures. Interactions are often
misinterpreted as unconditional marginal effects and seldom calculated for substantial
meaningful values (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006: 71-77), and I will therefore focus
on graphically plotting the results in a similar fashion as for the pooled model.
5.2.1 Opposition and own party
The interaction effect between time and the dichotomy for resignation calls from the
opposition is shown by the upper panel of figure 5.2.2. The results are both surprising
and possibly worrisome. Resignation calls from the opposition are estimated to have an
increasing effect on ministerial hazard during the earlier periods of the data, but the
uncertainty is very high, and the confidence band overlaps both the control group and the
entire band the comparison group with no resignation calls from the opposition. Indeed,
the confidence bands were too high to make a sensible plot including the periods before
1950 (which is why it starts at at 1950). The large uncertainties does in effect indicate
that the opposition has no say over ministerial dismissals, and H1b can safely be rejected.
In Chapter 7, I discuss whether this is a consequence of the opposition using resignation
calls strategically, and not with the purpose of actually getting the minister in question
dismissed.
Another frequently reoccurring type of resignation calls are those that come from the
party (or coalition partner) of the minister in question. The uncertainty of the point
estimate of resignation calls from ones own party is huge, and the lower panel of figure
5.2.2 confirms that this interaction is a null-finding; H1c can be rejected.
3For proportional hazards test of all variables, see table D.2 in the appendix.
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Figure 5.2.2: Hazard ratio plots of opposition
and own party influence.
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The hazard for dismissal is higher when
a minister gets a resignation call from his
own party, with a slightly decreasing curve
over time, but similarly to resignation calls
from the opposition, these resignation calls
have large uncertainties associated with
them, as indicated by the large green
confidence bands. The results are not
overly surprising because resignation calls
from ones own party are quite diverse,
ranging from those aimed at strengthening
the parliamentary group to those aimed
at dismissing perceived weak ministers.
However, both are aimed at removing the
minister from the cabinet, making these
results at least a little bit strange. On
the other hand, this is the least occurring
resignation call in the data with only 9% of all ministers receiving such calls, which could
be the reason for the large uncertainties. I will discuss these findings more thoroughly in
Chapter 7.
5.2.2 Newspapers
One of the most interesting findings in this thesis is displayed in figure 5.2.3, which
confirms the expectation of H1d. Firstly, ministers that do not get resignation calls from
papers can not be distinguished from the control group at any time. Indeed, the control
group and the blue line plus band are quite similar in figure 5.2.3.
Secondly, and most importantly, the two lines of figure 5.2.3 represent the same
minister with and without a resignation call from newspapers. Because the green band
does not overlap the blue band after the early 1970s, this means that we are quite
certain that ministers, otherwise equal, are more likely to be dismissed when receiving a
resignation call from a newspaper than those that do not. Indeed, at the end of the period,
we are certain (see the lower part of the green confidence band) that a resignation call
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Figure 5.2.3: Effect of resignation calls from paper over time.
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from a newspaper increases the hazard by over 50%, while the point estimated hazard
is almost 3 times higher for these ministers. This means that newspapers have more
influence on ministerial durability than both the opposition and the minister’s own party.
I will discuss why this could be a democratic problem more thoroughly in the following
chapters.
5.3 Summary
To sum the results, ministers are found to be held accountable by their party leaders
when they perform badly; resignation calls generally put ministers at risk of dismissal.
Furthermore, resignation calls from the opposition or the minister’s own party seem to
not have an effect on tenure by themselves, while newspapers carry some influence. The
adequateness of resignation calls measure as a performance indicator will be thoroughly
handled in section 6.2 and Chapter 7.
Political experience also matters for ministerial durability; ministers with previous
cabinet experience are less durable than fresh ministers, while parliamentary experience
leads to longer tenure. These conflicting effects are interesting, and suggest, on the one
hand, that the previous cabinet experience effect really is attributed to the wear-and-tear
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mechanism. On the other hand, parliamentary experience is expected to increase tenure,
which is parallel to findings of other studies (for example, Bucur (2013; 2015)). Hence,
the argument of Fischer et al. (2012: 515) that these ministers have proven themselves by
working their way through the party is supported by this thesis. The party elite measures,
recording ministers with both parliamentary and of youth party experience, indicates that
ministers with local youth party experience are less prone to dismissal than ministers
without youth experience, whereas experience from the central youth party organization
had the opposite effect. The conflicting effects combined with large uncertainties made
me hesitant to make any certain assessment with regard to these variables.
Surprisingly, cabinet characteristics are not found to be relevant for how safe ministers
are; it does not matter whether the cabinet has majority status in parliament or consist
of several parties. Hence, this could be an indication that party system has little impact
on ministerial durability, but more research on multi-party systems must be done before
this claim can bear any weight.
Lastly, age is the only personal characteristic variable with certain effect on
ministerial tenure; older ministers have shorter tenures than their younger counterparts.
Consequently, if the assumption of age measuring career ambition holds, more ambitious
ministers are less likely to be relieved from their position than less ambitious minister.
However, the strong effect of age could indicate that it also measures some other
characteristics, such as health problems – a point that will be discussed further in the
next chapter. As for gender and education, there is no evidence in the data that these
have any effect on ministerial durability. I will, nevertheless, show that female and higher
education ministers are more prone to getting resignation calls in the next chapter, which
might indicate that their effect in the durability analysis is underestimated.
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The results discussed above are futile if the model does not fit the data properly. In this
chapter, I will thus treat model fit and alternative specifications1. Firstly, I show how
predicted risk based on the pooled and actor-based event models show that they predict
higher risk for ministers that are dismissed than surviving ministers. Secondly, I show
that no substantially influential outliers are found from the two event models.
Thirdly, I turn the tables by analyzing resignation calls as the dependent variable.
The point of this secondary analysis is to explore whether resignation calls really are good
for measuring performance. As will be shown, the analysis indicates that some concerns
must be raised with regard to using resignation calls exclusively as a performance measure.
Especially, ministerial tenure has a clear effect on how many resignation calls a minister
gets; the longer ministers sit, the more vulnerable they are to getting resignation calls.
This raises some concerns over endogeneity with regard to the survival models presented
in Chapter 5.
Finally, I estimate alternative survival models for testing the robustness of the results.
Most importantly, I introduce a model with resignation calls per year in cabinet to
account for the endogeneity problems, which also proves to give a strong effect to the
resignation call measure. Furthermore, I check the robustness of the age measure by
adding a second-degree polynomial and adding age at first entry as independent variables.
This does, all in all, confirm the age measure as a fairly good proxy for ambition.
6.1 Predictive fit and outliers
As discussed in Chapter 4, there is no estimation of the baseline hazard in the Cox
PH model, which makes predicting duration impossible. Figure 6.1.1 rather shows the
1As I do not show the full alternative models, these are provided in the documentation found at
https://github.com/martigso/ministersNor
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Figure 6.1.1: Predicted risk from actor-based and pooled resignation call models.
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predicted in-sample risk with one panel for each of the two models. The lines represent the
linear correlation between duration on the x-axis and predicted risk on the y-axis, where
the dismissed ministers are shown by the dark cyan line and ribbon, and the surviving
ministers by the light cyan line and ribbon. The ribbons represent 95% confidence intervals
for the linear correlation.
Most importantly, dismissed ministers are generally predicted to have higher risk of
termination than surviving ministers in both models. This indicates that the models
manage to distinguish failing ministers from successful ministers fairly good. It should
also be noted that the predicted risk of termination is decreasing over time and stops
at under three years for dismissed ministers; the longer a minister sits, the lower is the
predicted risk of termination, and no ministers have been fired after occupying a cabinet
post for three and a half years. The reason for the crossing confidence bands at the highest
levels of duration is a consequence of few units in the forced exits category and declining
risk as duration increases. All in all, figure 6.1.1 gives a picture of models that fit the
data in a fairly good manner.
To show how well the model predicts substantially, lets take a look at the Lysbakken
and Støre example from the introduction. Lysbakken was at the time of entering cabinet
34 years old, had just over one year of cabinet experience, had parliamentary and youth
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party experience, while Støre was 52 years old, had 7 years of cabinet experience, and
no experience from parliament or youth organization. Recalling that Lysbakken resigned
and Støre retained his position, it is interesting that Lysbakken got three resignation
calls (newspaper, popular opinion, and his own party), while Støre got one (opposition).
Indeed, the actor-based resignation call model predicts a hazard ratio of 1.2 for Lysbakken,
and 0.6 for Støre. This means that the model expects Lysbakken, despite of his young
age, to be more likely for dismissal than Støre.
However, it is also interesting to see how the effects would have changed if units were
excluded from the analysis – a method for showing whether there are influential outliers
or not. Figure 6.1.2 displays the change in effects for all ministers and variables of the
pooled resignation call model. Each point in the figure represents a minister in the data,
and the vertical lines from zero how much estimates in the model would have changed if
Figure 6.1.2: Influential case analysis – Pooled resignation call model.
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6.1. Predictive fit and outliers
that particular unit was excluded from the analysis.
Three variables seem contain some influential units here: reshuﬄes and both youth
experience variables. Five ministers would skew the reshuﬄe effect towards zero with a
good margin if they were removed. This is not too problematic as the effect would go closer
to zero, only giving a more certain null-finding. The same goes for the youth experience
from central party organization; if the biggest outliers were removed, the results would
only more certainly confirm the null-hypothesis. The outliers on the youth experience
from local party organization are more troublesome; one of the ministers would influence
the estimate by being excluded from the regression with a -0.1 adjustment. This means
that the confidence interval of this effect would barely have a non-zero crossing effect,
and my concerns regarding the uncertainty of effect are further confirmed: it should be
treated as a null-finding.
Figure 6.1.3: Influential case analysis – Actor-based resignation call model.
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Chapter 6. Model fit and robustness
For the actor-based resignation call model, the same method for influential statistics
as above is shown in figure 6.1.3. The results are quite similar as in model 1: reshuﬄes,
and the youth party variables would be skewed towards zero if influential units were
removed. Also, the variable for resignation calls from the opposition and the minister’s
own party have some highly influential observations, but these would not have any effect
on the results if removed either. However, the newspaper resignation call measure outliers
were somewhat more important, with estimate changes as high as ±0.250. To be sure
this finding was robust enough, I ran a model without these outliers. As shown in figure
6.1.4, this model gave very similar results to those of model 2 (see figure 5.2.3), though
with somewhat broader confidence bands and steeper curve for the comparison minister
with resignation calls.
Figure 6.1.4: Effect of resignation calls from paper after excluding influential cases.
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6.2 Resignation calls
Thus far, resignation calls have been treated as an independent variable affecting
ministerial tenure, but what does resignation calls really measure? In this section, I
will discuss some of the problems with using resignation calls as a performance measure
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and analyze which ministerial attributes contributes to resignation calls through a count
regression model. If resignation calls truly measure performance exclusively, none of
the ministerial attributes used in the previous chapter should have a substantial effect
on them. As the literature does not provide a clear guidance for what to expect, this
analysis is to a large extent explorative. The main goal is to explore what kind of noise
(what other factors the variable measures) is associated with the pooled resignation call
measure. As will be shown, there is quite a lot of noise in the resignation call variable,
which means that it might either steal some of the effect from other variables, or indicate
that the effect of resignation calls on ministerial durability, found in the previous chapter,
is an underestimation of the true effect.
6.2.1 Which ministers are asked to resign?
Because the resignation call variable is a count variable – the number of times something
has happened – linear regression models are often inefficient, inconsistent, and biased
(Long 1997: 217). This is especially the case whenever the variable have an overweight
of zeroes, as is the case with the resignation call variable (see figure 4.3.3). Because the
resignation call variable is also overdispersed (the variance is greater than the mean (Long
1997: 218)), I use the negative binomial regression model, which allows the variance of
the dependent variable to exceed the mean (Long 1997: 230). In theory, a two part
hurdle regression – estimating one set of binary (zero to one) coefficients and one set of
coefficients for counts above one – would have been suitable because it assumes that it is
harder (or easier) to receive resignation calls when a minister has no previous resignation
calls, compared to ministers that have already gotten resignation calls. However, there
is not enough variation in the counts above one for the resignation call variable to work
with this model. Hence, the less data demanding negative binomial regression model will
be used. The downside is that the model does not fit the data in a fully satisfying way;
it underpredicts the zero and above one counts, in addition to overpredicting the one
counts. However, it is sufficient for asserting whether there is any noise in the resignation
call measure.
The count model, shown in figure 6.2.1 (also, see table C.2 in the appendix), mainly
consist of variables used in the previous chapter, and two new variables to limit omitted
variable bias. Firstly, cumulative resignation calls are also controlled for. This variable
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counts all the resignation calls the minister has gotten in previous cabinets, and was
included to assert whether ministers that has been into hard weather before are more likely
to get in hard weather again. Secondly, duration is now introduced as an independent
variable. The logic is simply that ministers sitting longer should have more time to make
mistakes, and thus get more resignation calls.
The first thing to notice in figure 6.2.1 is that cabinet experience and age has next to
no effect, while parliamentary experience and cabinet attributes by far has zero-crossing
confidence intervals. None of these variables show evidence of having an effect on
resignation calls. Cumulative resignation calls, however, increase the chance of new
resignation calls with a confidence interval barely crossing zero. With a point estimate
of 0.205, each cumulative resignation call is expected to increase the number of new
Figure 6.2.1: Negative binomial regression of resignation calls.
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resignation calls by 22.8%. 2
The minister’s duration is also expected to increase the number of resignation calls;
ministers sitting two years are estimated to receive 36.4% more resignation calls than
ministers sitting one year. As the duration variable is centered at approximately one
and a half years, a minister sitting a full period (4 years) is expected to get 117.2%3
more resignation calls than average sitting ministers. This means that longer duration
causes ministers to get more resignation calls, and we already know that resignation calls
affect ministerial duration – indicating that there are some endogeneity problems with the
ministerial durability analysis (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 96). This is a problem
because the Cox PH model assumes that variables on the right hand side of the equation
are independent of the values of the dependent variable (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones
2004: 113). A solution to the endogeneity problem is set forward in the next section.
The youth experience variables behave much like they did in the survival analysis;
central experience is estimated to decrease the chance of receiving resignation calls, local
experience is expected to increase the amount of resignation calls, and both variables
are associated with too high uncertainties to make any concluding inferences about effect
strength.
Furthermore, the effects of cabinet type and structure indicate that ministers in
majority and coalition cabinets get more resignation calls than those in minority and
single-party cabinets. However, also this effect shows large uncertainties, with confidence
intervals crossing zero by some distance.
More interestingly, women are more prone to receive resignation calls than men.
Indeed, women are expected to receive 83.5% more resignation calls than men. We have
already seen that resignation calls decrease, and that gender does neither increase or
decrease ministerial durability. Hence, because women get more resignation calls, this
could either mean that they are more resistant after getting resignation calls than men,
or that some of the gender effect in the survival analysis is stolen by the resignation call
measure. This will be discussed more thoroughly in the next chapter.
Finally, also education has a substantial effect on resignation calls. Ministers with
lower education are expected to receive 48.3% less resignation calls than ministers with
2Percentage increase/decrease is calculated by 100[exp(βk ∗δ)−1], where βk is the coefficient and δ is
the unit increase (Long 1997: 225): 100[exp(0.205∗1)−1] = 22.8%.
3100[exp(0.310∗ (4−1.5))−1] = 117.2%
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higher education. The same logic as with gender applies here: either the higher education
ministers tolerate more resignation calls, or the resignation call variable sucks up some of
the effect of the education variable.
In sum, the resignation call measure is not independent of the other variables used in
the survival analysis of Chapter 5. Consequently, this means that there is a lot of noise
in the resignation call variable – it does not exclusively measure ministerial performance.
The problems with resignation calls as a performance measure will be more thoroughly
discussed in the next chapter, but in the following section, I show that the endogeneity
problem is not big enough for H1a to be rejected.
6.3 Alternative durability models
6.3.1 Resignation calls per year
In light of the findings in section 6.2, I replaced the pooled resignation call measure of
model 1 (see Chapter 5) with a measure for resignation calls per year in office to account for
the endogeneity problem. That is, I divide the number of resignation calls a minister gets
by the length of his tenure (in years). Notably, none of the other independent variables
changed to a degree that the assessments of the initial analysis had to be revised (model
3 in table C.1 shows that local youth experience has a severely reduced effect, increasing
the initial suspicions of how unstable the measure is).
I also excluded four ministers that received resignation calls in very short tenures (the
limit was set at 5 resignation calls per year): Nils Langhelle spent 47 days as Minister
of Transport in the Torp I cabinet, before taking over the Department of Defense. In
that period, Langhelle received one resignation call from Verdens Gang, claiming he was
a weak minister. Thus, Langhelle had over 7 resignation calls per year. Grete Faremo
had the misfortune of surviving only 54 days under the Jagland I cabinet, receiving three
resignation calls after it is uncovered that Berge Furre of the Socialist Left Party was
surveilled during her tenure as Minister of Justice. Faremo was eventually sacked, and
had over 20 resignation calls per year. A similar fate was given to Terje Rød-Larsen in the
same cabinet, who was fired after only 14 days in the post as Minister of Administration,
and also managing to get three resignation calls for failing to tax stock profits in the
1980s. Rød-Larsen was excluded because he had 78 resignation calls per year. Finally,
Manuela Ramin-Osmundsen, who’s dismissal was discussed in section 2.2, received three
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resignation calls in her 120 days in office, giving 9 resignation calls per year.
Figure 6.3.1: Effect of resignation calls per year.
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The new Cox PH model gives a point estimate of 0.790 for resignation calls per year,
which means that a one unit increase in resignation calls per year is expected to raise the
risk of termination by 120.4% (see model 3 of table C.1 in the appendix). Figure 6.3.1
displays the effect of the resignation calls per year variable. As can be seen, the effect is
strong, but hard to compare in terms of relative strength with the initial pooled resignation
calls measure because they are based on different scales. Getting one resignation call per
year would implicate an expected risk increase of almost 100% compared to ministers with
no resignation calls, and ministers getting around two resignation calls per year have four
times the risk of termination than their uncontroversial colleagues. Indeed, 63 ministers
in the data have over one resignation call per year, making this a common occurrence,
rather than an extraordinary case.
All in all, these findings indicate that the endogeneity problems discovered through
the count model above are not as severe as firstly anticipated. Indeed, the model using
resignation calls per year is also a better fit to the data with an estimated AIC value of
1012 compared to 1068 for the initial pooled resignation call model. However, the initial
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analysis should not be disregarded totally as some of the ministers are excluded from the
secondary analysis. Neither does this fix all the problems of the resignation call measure;
there is still a certain amount of noise associated with it. Some further improvement
points will be suggested in Chapter 7.
6.3.2 Age as ambition measure?
A second proxy measure is the age measure. In this thesis, I use age as a measure
for ambition, but I have also opened for the possibility that it measures things such as
health, skill, and that the effect is not linear. On the one hand, health related issues are,
as discussed, problematic to measure because it is hard to differentiate between actual
and alleged health related issues.
The age as skill theory, on the other hand, is more easy to test; the upper panel
of figure 6.3.2 presents the effect of age when only measured at the first cabinet
entry of each minister, added to the pooled resignation call model. The thought
behind this method is that ministers appointed to cabinet positions at an early
Figure 6.3.2: Alternative age measures.
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point in their life are more skillful than
other ministers. As is evident from figure
6.3.2, this variable has no effect because the
line is at almost the same hazard ratio for
all ages at first entry and the confidence
interval crosses the control group on all
values of age.
The lower panel of figure 6.3.2 shows
the hazard rate (not ratio) when age is
added as a square term instead of age from
the initial pooled regression model. This is
done to control for whether the effect of age
is curvilinear. As can be seen, the effect is
not even close to being curvilinear here; it
is a straight line. Both findings discussed
here justifies using age as a continuous
linear variable, as was done in in model
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5.1.1.
Lastly, I ran models excluding the One Party State period and models excluding
cabinets sitting shorter than one year. Neither of these gave any interesting changes in
the effects of any variables, except for the fact that also here they effect of local youth
experience proved to have weaker effect on durability, further confirming the unstableness
of this measure. The full alternative models can, as mentioned, be found in the online
documentation of the data.
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In this chapter, I start by discussing the implications and limitations of the results
from the analyses, with special focus on what the resignation call effect means for the
principal-agent relationship within Norwegian cabinets, why the validity of resignation
calls as a performance measure is somewhat limited, and how this validity could be
improved. Furthermore, I address what the implications of political experience having
diverging effects are, why cabinet attributes are not found to have importance, and some
of the problems with the personal characteristic factors.
In the end of the chapter, I deliberate on how generalizable the results are beyond
post-war Norway, before I give some suggestions for improvements and possible paths for
further studies.
7.1 Performance
Occupying a post in government is a prestigious political position with high stakes. To
remain in cabinet, ministers have to deliver policy development that matters to the
party leadership, the majority of parliament, and the voters. At least, that is what
the results of the analyses in this thesis indicate. The pooled resignation call model from
Chapter 5 showed that ministers getting resignation calls are more likely to be sacked
than the ministers not receiving resignation calls, and the results are fairly robust. In
principal-agent terms, this implies that party leaders hold ministers accountable when
they are publicly perceived to perform badly.
Additionally, the actor-based resignation call model indicates that the opposition
and the ministers own party (or coalition partners) have little influence on ministerial
durability, while resignation calls from newspapers are found increase the likelihood of
shorter ministerial tenure. This is interesting because it means that media performance
evaluations play a more important role than other actors’ performance evaluations. Thus,
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ministers that want to remain in their post could possibly be more occupied with pleasing
their party leaders through not getting bad publicity than actually implementing party
policies under their jurisdiction. Newspapers give an important channel for uncovering
misbehavior within the government, and the newspaper effect could come as a consequence
of these. But, I argue that this could pose a problem for Norwegian democracy; if party
leaders evaluate ministers on criticism by the media and not on their ability to carry
out the policy preferences of their party, we have a situation where an unelected entity
with no formal rights is able to influence the ministerial deselection process. Uncovering
shirking and sabotage is an advantage, but what happens afterwards should be decided
by the cabinet leaders, parliament, and parties. It might, however, also be the case
that party leaders do not care what newspapers write, and the effect simply reflects
that newspapers are well-informed on ministers and their status within the cabinet.
Nevertheless, I maintain that elected officials should be the ones who evaluate ministerial
performance.
The reasons for the lack of influence by opposition and parties are puzzling at face
value, but it also highlights some of the flaws with using resignation calls as a measure
of ministerial performance. On the one hand, the opposition can use resignation calls as
strategical maneuvers, aiming at a policy nudge towards their own party’s ideal point,
instead of resignation calls as a tool for actually making the minister resign. Resignation
calls from ones own party, on the other hand, are very diverse in nature, ranging from a
resignation call against Harald Løbak (Labor Party – Gerhardsen V) for going against the
majority of his own party in parliament, to resignation calls aiming at strengthening the
party’s position in parliament, as happened in 1964 when the Labor Party asked for Trygve
Bratteli’s removal from cabinet because they wanted him to lead their parliamentary group
(Verdens Gang 1964).
But does resignation calls actually measure ministerial performance? The best answer
I can give is "maybe". Resignation calls are different from most of the other variables
used in this thesis, because they are not a direct observation of the systematized concept.
The measure does a good job of measuring public performance, in that it is responsive
to ministers being criticized publicly. What it does not account for, however, is hidden
performance – how satisfied the minister’s principal is with the performance of the minister
behind closed doors. Indeed, we know little of how the inner principal-agent mechanics
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in cabinets work, and even less how to measure it. Furthermore, I have shown that
not only does resignation calls fail to measure the full range of ministerial performance,
they are also noisy in that they correlate with other ministerial attributes such as gender
and education. For the field of ministerial durability to move beyond applying the same
framework in new case-studies, I argue that these problems should be addressed through
validation.
Firstly, the content validity – how well the indicator represents the full meaning
of the systematized concept (Adcock and Collier 2001: 537) – is low, because hidden
performance is not caught by resignation calls. Secondly, criterion validity – whether
scores of the indicator are correlated with other indicators measuring the same thing
(Adcock and Collier 2001: 537) – is low, because there are no alternative measures
to compare resignation calls with yet. However, the construct validity – the indicator
is empirically associated with theoretical expectations of another variable (Adcock and
Collier 2001: 537) – of resignation calls as ministerial performance measure has been
increased by finding that it increases the risk of ministerial deselection.
The argument is that the resignation call measure needs to undergo some serious
measurement validation: either through development of new indicators based on the same
systematized concept that can be compared with resignation calls (convergent validation),
or constructions of indicators based on different systematized concepts of ministerial
performance to be compared with resignation calls (nomological validation).
Finally, there are some concerns with regard to reliability of the resignation call
collection. Some resignation calls are not straightforward to code as resignation calls. For
example, it is not given that other academics would regard the Bratteli case, described
above, as a resignation call, and there is no guarantee that all resignation calls are
identified when going through the newspapers. A possible improvement here is to get
more people to go through the same material simultaneously, and compare the results.
This is, however, a resource heavy task, unfeasible without funding.
7.2 Experience
The political experience measures do not meet the same validity and reliability problems as
the resignation call measure. Cabinet, parliament and youth party experience are directly
observable, have incontestable operationalizations, and are, with regard to reliability, only
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exposed to random coding errors.
In Chapter 5, it was established that previous cabinet experience increased the
probability, and parliamentary experience decreased the probability for ministerial
dismissal. Although this is in line with both the hypotheses of this paper and the findings
of other studies (Bucur 2013; Berlinski et al. 2012), the findings are puzzling at first
glance. Both are measures of political experience, and the first expectation should be
that they have similar effects on durability.
So why do party leaders prefer ministers with parliamentary experience, and not
ministers with previous cabinet experience? On the one hand, I have argued that low
durability among ministers with previous cabinet experience might be a consequence of a
"wear-and-tear" effect, where ministers get exhausted by their responsibilities, and party
leaders get tired of working with the same people over a long period of time. Additionally,
new party leaders might want to find place in cabinet for party members they have close
relationships with. For example, Odvar Nordli replaced half of his cabinet during his
second term, where half of the dismissed ministers had previously occupied posts within
the Bratteli II cabinet1. Party leaders might also replace long-sitting ministers because
they simply want to keep the cabinet vital and fresh.
Parliamentary experience, on the other hand, might both increase ministerial
durability because these ministers are more knowledgeable on how politics work and
because parties want to reward loyalty with loyalty – politicians that work their way
through the party should be better equipped to know the party line and act based on
it. In terms of accountability, cabinet ministers are much more exposed to the public
than parliamentary members. Bad performance in parliament is seldom noticed publicly,
while cabinet ministers are susceptible to vultures circling over them in wait for a political
scandal. Finally, the formal rule that ministers can not sit in parliament and cabinet at
the same time could, especially for small parties, exhaust the pool of the best politicians
whenever the party holds portfolios and parliamentary seats at the same time.
The results of previous experience from youth party organization is, as mentioned,
more difficult to assess a substantial meaning to. Having experience from the national
(central) organization clearly has to be treated as a null-finding, as the uncertainties
are too large. As for previous membership in local youth party organization, the effect
1The dismissed ministers that took part in both cabinets were: Leif Jørgen Aune, Gro Harlem
Brundtland, Jens Evensen, Bjartmar Gjerde, Per Kleppe, Annemarie Lorentzen, and Inger Louise Valle.
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proved very uncertain, and was argued to also be treated as a null-finding. Consequently,
long service within ones party is not found to give any benefits for cabinet ministers.
When ministers engage in shirking or sabotage, the results indicate that they do not get
the benefit of the doubt because of party loyalty. A little note should be added here;
the youth party experience measure can be replaced or supplemented by party executive
measures, which has not yet been gathered for Norwegian parties in the whole post-war
period.
7.3 Cabinet characteristics
The null-findings with regard to cabinet attributes are somewhat surprising and
interesting. Minority cabinet ministers are not found to be more or less durable than
their majority colleagues. In effect, this could mean that the parliamentary basis of
cabinets has little relevance for ministerial durability. The same can be said about the
cabinet structure variable; ministers in coalitions seems to be evaluated by similar criteria
as ministers in single-party cabinets. Hence, the Norwegian case does not stand out from,
for example, the British case, where most cabinets have majority status, based on these
attributes alone.
Consequently, party leaders are able to judge ministers on performance and merits,
rather than being forced to restructure the cabinet due to the political environment. Or,
they might act strategically in allocating portfolios by taking into consideration whether
party members will be tolerated by the majority of parliament before appointing them.
Indeed, the absence of dissolution rights in Norway could contribute to this latter point;
party leaders might be more reluctant to appoint controversial ministers susceptible to
votes of no confidence, which could lead to situations where they must take a stance on
whether to stand by their minister or put forward a confidence motion over the minister’s
destiny.
Furthermore, one could argue that these findings indicate that ministerial durability is
not different between countries as a consequence of different political systems, but rather
due to other country specific attributes. However, such conclusions should be treated with
care because similar studies on other countries could prove that the cabinet attributes are
important elsewhere.
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7.4 Personal characteristics
Finally, gender and education was not found to have an effect on ministerial durability
in the Norwegian case. This could put some strains on media studies finding that women
are more easily demonized than men. However, the analysis with resignation calls as
the dependent variable showed that women are more prone to getting resignation calls
than men, which at least means that public hostility is greater towards women. It could
also mean that women are more durable than men after receiving resignation calls, which
possibly is a consequence of there being an expectation of having a certain amount of
women in cabinet (depending on the time period) in combination with the seemingly
shallow female recruitment pools in Norwegian political parties (Eilertsen 2014: 39-40).
Age, on the other hand, proves highly influential on ministerial durability. The age
variable was included as an ambition measure because it is impossible to get stated
ambition for the ministers in the data when they stretch as far back as they do here. If the
assumption (that age is a measure for ambition) holds, this means that more ambitious
ministers are preferred by party leaders over less ambitious ministers; a commonsensical
finding at best, but I also argue that it is important to control for in the model – in both
this study and other studies (Berlinski et al. 2012) – as it has a lot of explanatory power.
Lastly, ministers are not found to be more or less prone to be dismissed after being
reshuﬄed. This is unsurprising as reshuﬄes can be used both as punishment and reward,
and because it is hard to distinguish these two types of reshuﬄes in a measure.
7.5 Generalization
This study has given a good indication on what determines ministerial durability in
post-war Norway, but can the findings be generalized to other populations? For example,
consider the new blue-blue coalition (Solberg I) between the Conservatives and the
Progress Party: we can expect that ministers from the Progress Party generally are safe
because they have never participated in cabinets before (no previous cabinet experience);
the mean age of 43 years is the lowest in the post-war period, and low age is found to make
ministers more durable; the cabinet is heavy on parliamentary experience, also estimated
to increase durability. Indeed, replacements have yet to occur in the Solberg I cabinet,
after having remained in office for about one and a half years – only the Borten I and
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Bondevik I cabinets dismissed their first minister later than the current cabinet length of
the Solberg I cabinet.
The external validity beyond Norway is, however, relatively low. Other multi-party
systems could prove to be completely different to Norway. Especially, the cabinet
attributes having no effect in Norway does not mean that they will be unimportant
in other countries. However, combined with other studies (see Chapter 2), we can be
even more certain that resignation calls, previous cabinet experience, and age generally
decrease ministerial durability, while the effect of education, gender, and reshuﬄes can be
argued to have slightly more uncertain interpretations based on the results here.
7.6 Further studies
As we now have a good idea of how ministerial durability in Norway works, what is the
natural step forward? Of course, case studies on other countries would always prove
useful in pinning down general trends of what makes ministers survive longer. In the long
run, however, cross-case studies looking into how different institutional factors, such as
investiture rules, vote of (no) confidence, election system, and more, affects ministerial
durability would be crucial.
As for measuring ministerial performance, which I argue is one of the main potential
improvements within case-studies, I maintain that new measures should be developed
to validate resignation calls. For example, hearings, interpellations, and questions in
parliament could be the base of measuring how well a ministers perform; a minister that
never gets called to parliament should be likely to perform well, while ministers that are
frequently called to parliament should be likely to not perform well. There would, as with
resignation calls, be some noise attached to such measures; policy disagreements between
the minister and the opposition, could be an example of this.
In the Norwegian case, performance validation could be a natural starting point
for improving the analyses of this thesis. Additionally, better party elite measures
could shed new light on the relationship between political experience, parties, and
ministerial durability. Furthermore, case studies on why individual ministers are sacked
(mainly based on scandal studies) are plentiful; case studies on why individual ministers
are not sacked after a scandal, personal error, or for other reasons, has not been as
prominent in the literature. This is a problem of what King, Keohane and Verba (1994:
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129) calls selection on the dependent variable (ministerial dismissal); deep cross-case
analyses of individual ministers with similar situations and different outcomes could prove
enlightening.
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The motivation for writing this thesis was to contribute to the fast growing ministerial
durability literature by empirically exploring why some ministers in post-war Norway are
fired and others not. I apply a slightly modified version of the principal-agent theory,
where I argue that party leaders are the main principals of ministers, to scrutinize how
ministers are held accountable. The general finding is that Norwegian ministers are
judged on their performance, merits, and ambitions rather than on unchangeable personal
attributes.
The most intriguing finding is that ministers performing poorly are less durable
than well-performing ministers, where performance is measured through resignation calls.
More specifically, this means that party leaders hold ministers accountable when they
do not deliver what is expected from them; the accountability link between the cabinet
principal and agents works in the Norwegian case. However, I also find that party leaders
consider resignation calls from newspapers more seriously than those from parties and
the opposition. Consequently, this could indicate that there is a democratic deficiency in
what determines ministerial dismissals.
In addition, I have used quite a bit of space on assessing whether resignation calls
should be accepted as a performance measure, finding that there are several problems with
this approach. Based on a count model with resignation calls as the dependent variable,
I found that female ministers and ministers with higher education are more susceptible
to receiving resignation calls than male and lower education ministers – indicating that
there is a fair amount of statistical noise in the measure. Moreover, I found that there are
endogeneity problems in the resignation call measure, in that ministers with long tenures
receive more resignation calls than ministers with short tenures. However, a model where
resignation calls are replaced with resignation calls per year showed that this problem
was not too severe, but further studies should at least test the resignation call measure
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in a similar manner. I also argue that some effort should be made to construct different
measures for ministerial performance as alternatives to resignation calls to increase the
validity of the measure.
Furthermore, non-performance based characteristics are also found to affect
ministerial durability in different ways: ministers with long service across cabinets are
found to be more prone to dismissal than newly employed ministers, while parliamentary
experience seems to increase durability. Because these two measures of political experience
have diverging effects, I argue that the cabinet experience decrease ministerial durability
as a consequence of a "wear-and-tear" effect; party leaders replace ministers that sit for
a long period of time to keep the cabinet fresh. Parliamentary experience, however,
has given ministers political experience in the shadows of the public, grooming the best
politicians for an arguably higher post in the cabinet, which should decrease the chance
of ministerial drift or bad performance.
The most important null-finding of this thesis is that both cabinet composition and
parliamentary basis are not found to have little impact on ministerial durability. No
matter whether the minister sits in a majority, minority, single-party, or coalition cabinet,
the risk of dismissal is not found to differ. Consequently, this could indicate that party
leaders do not replace ministers due to different political environments. In these results,
paths for further studies are plentiful; cross-country studies exploring whether cabinet
characteristics are irrelevant for ministerial durability would provide enriching insights
for the literature.
With regard to personal characteristics, age has been unveiled as important for tenure
– older ministers are more prone for dismissal than their younger counterparts. Because
age is used as a proxy for ambition, this means that party leaders appreciate the more
ambitious young party members over their older colleagues. However, I have also argued
that this effect could be overestimated because older ministers could have more health
related issues on a general basis, making them leave cabinet duties faster than youthful
ministers.
Finally, I argue that the internal validity of the thesis is high, but also that deeper
cross-case analyses of uncovered ministerial misbehavior leading to dismissal and not
leading to dismissal could give more flesh to the bone for the Norwegian case in particular.
However, I also maintain that the results of this thesis hardly can be generalized
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beyond Norway; comparative studies of several multi-party systems (and other types
of parliamentary democracies) would prove useful for discovering whether institutional
factors such as cabinet composition or parliamentary basis are more important, and
whether the same ministerial attributes affect durability similarly across countries.
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A Key words for resignation call collection
Table A.1: Key words for resignation call collection.
Fixed string Varying string
"Minister name" AND "gå* av*"
"må* gå*"
"bœr* gå*"
"burde* gå*"
"skulle* gå*"
"trekke* seg"
"avgang*"
"avskjed*"
"vurder* sin"
"vurder* stilling*"
"vurder* posisjon*"
"fratre*"
"takk* av"
"tre* tilb*"
"avsett*"
"avsatt"
"skift* ut"
"mistill*"
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B Jurisdiction categorization
Table B.1: Coding scheme for minister post to jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction Title (ENG) – Minister of... Title (NOR)
Administration
Government Administration Administrasjonsminister
Labour and Government Administration Arbeids- og administrasjonsminister
Labour and Social Inclusion Arbeids- og inkluderingsminister
Consumption and Government Administration Forbruker- og administrasjonsminister
Supply and Reconstruction Forsyning- og gjenreisningsminister
Reform Fornyingsminister
Planning Planleggingsminister
Labour Arbeidsminister
Ministers without portfolio
Agriculture Agriculture Landbruksminister
Culture Culture Kulturminister
Defense Defense Forsvarsminister
Education
Research and Higher Education Forsknings- og høyere utdanningsminister
Education and Church Affairs Kirke- og undervisningsminister
Education and Research Kunnskapsminister
Environment the Environment Miljøvernminister
Finance
Finance Finansminister
Prices Prisminister
Foreign affairs
International Development Bistandsminister
Human Rights Menneskerettighetsminister
Foreign Affairs Utenriksminister
International Development Utviklingsminister
Health Health Helseminister
Industry
Industry Industriminister
Trade and Industry Næringsminister
Petroleum and Energy Olje- og energiminister
Justice Justice Justisminister
Regional
Local Government Kommunalminister
Rebuilding Finnmark Minister for gjenoppbygging av Finnmark
Sea and fish
Fisheries Fiskeriminister
Maritime Law Havrettsminister
Shipping Skipsfartsminister
Social
Children and Family Affairs Barne- og familieminister
Family Affairs and Consumption Familie- og forbruksminister
Social Affairs Sosialminister
Trade Trade Handelsminister
Transport Transport and Communications Samferdselsminister
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C Regression tables
Table C.1: Cox proportional hazard models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Performance
RC pooled 0.247 (0.074)∗∗∗
RC per year 0.782 (0.118)∗∗∗
Time −0.170 (0.082)∗
RC opposition 0.909 (0.790)
RC own party 0.982 (1.605)
RC newspaper −0.458 (0.751)
Time:RC opposition −0.321 (0.226)
Time:RC own party −0.131 (0.448)
Time:RC newspaper 0.421 (0.219)
Experience
Cabinet exp. 0.114 (0.041)∗∗ 0.124 (0.042)∗∗ 0.100 (0.041)∗
Parliamentary exp. −0.658 (0.271)∗ −0.672 (0.271)∗ −0.604 (0.268)∗
Youth experience (central) −0.641 (0.540) −0.662 (0.553) −0.498 (0.550)
Youth experience (local) 0.845 (0.378)∗ 0.915 (0.387)∗ 0.724 (0.385)
Cabinet
Cabinet type (majority) 0.150 (0.221) −0.202 (0.266) 0.138 (0.224)
Cabinet structure (coalition) −0.261 (0.259) 0.025 (0.304) −0.337 (0.262)
Personal
Age (centered) 0.059 (0.016)∗∗∗ 0.059 (0.016)∗∗∗ 0.068 (0.016)∗∗∗
Gender (female) 0.338 (0.258) 0.300 (0.280) 0.370 (0.254)
Reshuﬄe −0.371 (0.490) −0.381 (0.491) −0.812 (0.537)
Education (lower) 0.003 (0.280) −0.002 (0.281) 0.075 (0.283)
AIC 1068.091 1062.625 1013.365
Num. events 98 98 95
Num. obs. 625 625 621
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05. Cox Proportion Hazards models where estimates are in hazard rates, and standard errors in parentheses.
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Table C.2: Negative binomial regression model
Dependent variable:
Resignation calls
Intercept −1.072
(−1.412, −0.732)
Cumulative RCs 0.205
(−0.007, 0.417)
Duration (centered years) 0.310
(0.073, 0.547)
Cabinet exp. −0.031
(−0.113, 0.052)
Parliamentary exp. 0.164
(−0.252, 0.581)
Youth experience (central) −0.252
(−0.902, 0.397)
Youth experience (local) 0.572
(0.031, 1.112)
Cabinet type (majority) 0.119
(−0.237, 0.475)
Cabinet structure (coalition) 0.120
(−0.249, 0.490)
Age (centered) 0.009
(−0.014, 0.033)
Gender (female) 0.607
(0.245, 0.969)
Education (lower) −0.661
(−1.143, −0.178)
Observations 563
θ 0.566 (0.103)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,070.871
Note: Estimates from negative binomial regression
model with confidence intervals in parentheses.
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D Proportional hazards tests
Table D.1: Global proportional hazards test – Model 1
rho chisq p
RC pooled 0.092 0.759 0.384
Age 0.040 0.181 0.671
Gender (male) −0.001 0.0001 0.991
Youth experience (central) 0.123 1.495 0.221
Youth experience (local) −0.113 1.351 0.245
Cabinet exp. −0.091 0.720 0.396
Parliamentary exp. −0.005 0.003 0.958
Education (lower) 0.004 0.002 0.965
Reshuﬄe 0.098 0.961 0.327
Cabinet type (majority) 0.048 0.222 0.638
Cabinet structure (coalition) −0.0003 0.00001 0.997
Global 4.990 0.932
Table D.2: Global proportional hazards test – Model 2
rho chisq p
RC opposition 0.161 1.249 0.264
Time −0.035 0.157 0.692
RC newspaper −0.085 0.378 0.539
RC own party −0.054 0.292 0.589
Age 0.080 0.832 0.362
Gender (male) 0.002 0.001 0.977
Youth experience (central) 0.113 1.275 0.259
Youth experience (local) −0.124 1.696 0.193
Cabinet exp. −0.116 1.229 0.268
Parliamentary exp. −0.009 0.009 0.927
Education (lower) −0.010 0.012 0.914
Reshuﬄe 0.111 1.244 0.265
Cabinet type (majority) −0.042 0.177 0.674
Cabinet structure (coalition) −0.009 0.008 0.927
Time:RC opposition −0.132 0.952 0.329
Time:RC newspaper 0.026 0.039 0.844
Time:RC own party 0.093 0.926 0.336
Global 13.542 0.699
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E Frailty terms
Table E.1: Frailty terms
Model 1 Model 2
Administration 0.519 0.584
Agriculture −0.077 −0.042
Culture −0.278 −0.284
Defence −0.382 −0.395
Education −0.186 −0.123
Environment 0.109 0.140
Finance −0.227 −0.262
Foreign affairs −0.464 −0.539
Health −0.175 −0.143
Industry 0.447 0.486
Justice −0.049 −0.099
Regional 0.128 0.087
Sea and fish 0.074 −0.015
Social 0.041 0.075
Trade 0.129 0.138
Transport −0.182 −0.308
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